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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
At first blush, it might seem odd that matters like closing a record
or providing government representation in administrative hearings are at
all controversial. After all, if one views government decisionmaking
from a judicial or formal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")'
I Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237, Ch. 324, §§ 1-12. Codified by Pub. L. No. 89-554 (1966) in
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perspective, these are basic propositions. But Social Security
Administration ("SSA") disability decisions take place in a different
world, where the claimant is viewed as a potential beneficiary and the
government as a supportive force, and where procedures are allocated
accordingly. SSA hearings are one of the few types of proceedings
where the agency is unrepresented and where the record is left open
throughout the administrative appeals process to ensure that the
claimant's file is complete. The debate over adversary and non-
adversary decisionmaking is perhaps most persistent in the world of
government disability adjudication.2 Despite the use of administrative
law judges ("ALJ"s) at SSA hearings, which usually signals use of the
formal adjudication provisions of the APA, 3 the process is still
considered informal and non-adversarial. 4 We have sought to respect
the different approach to adjudication in disability cases while exploring
possible changes in current practice relative to government
representation and closing the record.5
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (2003).
2 See, e.g., Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323-26 (1985)
(extolling the virtues of the Veterans' Administration's system of non-adversary "paternalistic"
adjudication).
3 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (2003). SSA disability adjudications are the only instance
where administrative law judges ("ALJ"s) are employed without regard to the formal adjudication
processes of the APA.
4 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (discussing ALJ's "three-hat" role). See
also Broz v. Schmeiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1364 (11 th Cir. 1982) (ALJ has a "duty of inquiry"
where claimant is unrepresented). However, the debate over the use of non-ALJ adjudicators is a
wider one. See, e.g., William F. Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?: Using Informal
Procedures for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1993), Jeffrey S.
Lubbers, APA Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65
(1996).
5 Current practices are, of course, subject to change and as this article was going to press
SSA proposed significant new modifications to the disability adjudication process. On
September 25, 2003, the Commissioner of Social Security, Jo Anne B. Barnhart, testified before
the House Subcommittee on Social Security concerning SSA's management plans. She cited the
authors' report as support for several modifications contained in her testimony (and discussed
later in this article). These include closing the record after the ALJ hearing and appointing a
"Reviewing Official" who would be responsible for reviewing state Disability Determination
Service ("DDS") decisions and also would prepare prehearing reports before the ALJ hearing. In
addition, Commissioner Barnhart recommends eliminating the DDS reconsideration phase and
replacing Appeals Council review with a centralized quality control process, followed, where
necessary, by review of an oversight panel (consisting of two ALJs and an "Administrative
Appeals" judge). These modifications, to be implemented by regulations effective October 2005,
are designed to reduce processing time "by at least 25%" and to increase "decisional consistency
and accuracy." See Hearing on the Social Security Administration's Management of the Office of
Hearings and Appeals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Barnhart Statement] (statement of Jo Anne
B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration). See also Hearing on the Social
Security Administration's Management of the Office of Hearings and Appeals: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2003)
[hereinafter Schieber Statement] (statement of Sylvester J. Schieber, Member, Social Security
Advisory Board). The modifications and recommendations contained in the Barnhart Statement
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This article proceeds as follows: Part I explains why this article is
timely and how it fits in against the background of prior studies and
reports from the SSAB, the SSA and other organizations. Part II
provides an overview of the Social Security disability determination
process. Part III describes current regulations and practices that relate
to compiling the record for decision. Part IV discusses the SSA's mid-
1980's experiment with government representatives at disability
hearings, the SSA Representation Project ("SSARP"), and the federal
district court case, Sailing v. Bowen,6 that enjoined the SSARP as a
violation of due process. Those who oppose any further SSA
experimentation with representatives tend to rely on the SSARP
experience and the Salling case. This part also shows that the SSARP
involved an adversarial approach to representation that we seek to
distinguish from the approach recommended in this article. Part V
presents our analysis of the primary problem that gives rise to questions
about whether the government should be represented at Social Security
hearings and when the record should be closed: Social Security
disability decisions are often made on the basis of an incomplete and
ever-changing evidentiary record. It also explains how this problem can
be addressed most effectively in the context of examining the issues
raised by government representation and closing the record. Part VI
describes and supports our specific recommendations. It also addresses
the question of whether any statutory change or new regulations might
be required to implement our recommendations.
I. BACKGROUND
The issues raised by this article are not new. As discussed in detail
later in Part IV of this article, the Social Security Administration
conducted a controversial experiment in the mid-1980's in which SSA
was represented by government attorneys at disability hearings in
selected hearing offices; notwithstanding SSA's decision to terminate
the experiment following the entry of a district court injunction from
which it did not appeal, 7 knowledgeable observers have expressed
renewed interest in this idea. 8 Similarly, the idea of changing the SSA's
and the Schieber Statement are discussed further in this article infra notes 99, 109, 257-58, and
accompanying text.
6 641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1986).
7 See Salling, 641 F. Supp. 1046. See also infra Part IV.C.
8 See, e.g., EVALUATION OF SSA'S DISABILITY QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROCESSES AND
DEVELOPMENT OF QA OPTIONS THAT WILL SUPPORT THE LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT OF THE
DISABILITY PROGRAM, Report to the Social Security Administration by The Lewin Group, Inc.,
Pugh Ettinhger McCarthy Associates, L.L.C. & Cornell University 22-23 (Mar. 16, 2001)
(hereinafter LEWIN REPORT).
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"open file" system9 has been suggested many times over the years by
various advisory bodies and specialists in the field.' 0 The SSAB
recommended recently that both ideas be given serious consideration
and this article responds to that recommendation."
These suggestions deserve renewed attention due to an increasing
administrative caseload at SSA and the rise in private representation of
claimants seeking disability benefits. The number of disability claims is
expected to increase substantially in the future for several reasons: (1)
the impending retirement of Baby Boomers;12 (2) the downturn of the
economy in the last several years; 13 (3) the resumption of continuing
disability reviews ("CDRs") by the SSA; 14 and (4) the increasing
tendency of private insurance companies to require, as a condition of
payments, that claimants pursue offsetting SSA disability benefits.15 In
addition, these figures do not reflect the 75,000 Medicare cases a year
heard by SSA in FY 2002,16 a figure that may increase markedly due to
9 Currently, additional evidence can be added to the record, with only limited restrictions,
throughout the administrative appeals process. See infra Part III.B.
1o See, e.g., LEWIN REPORT, supra note 8, at 23; Administrative Conference of the U.S.,
Recommendation 90-94, infra note 29, at 4.
11 See, e.g., SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, CHARTING THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL
SECURITY'S DISABILITY SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 19-21 (Jan. 2001),
available at http://www.ssab.gov/disabilitywhitepap.pdf.
12 See Statement of Stanford G. Ross, Chairman Social Security Advisory Board at the Tenth
National Educational Conference, Association of Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 3, 2001)
("SSA actuaries project continued rapid growth as the baby boomcrs reach the greater likelihood
of disability."); SSAB, AGENDA FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW CONGRESS
AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, 1-2, 16, 37 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.ssab.gov/Overviewl.pdf. Baby Boomers will begin to reach the age of 65 in 2011
and finish reaching 65 in 2030. When they begin to retire in 2011, there will be 40.4 million
seniors (or 13% of the population) and that will grow to 70.3 million (20% of the population) by
2030. See also Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Projects Doubling of Nation's
Population by 2100 (Jan. 13, 2000).
13 While the disability program is not an employment scheme, applications rise when the
economy falters. In April 2000, the national unemployment rate was 3.8%; in December 2002, it
was 6.0%-an increase of 58%. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/surveymost.
14 The SSA has completed its seven-year CDR plan, commenced in 1996. The plan is part of
the agency's response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). It calls for increasing annual CDRs from 603,000 in 1997 to 1.7 million
in 2002 with a peak year of 1.8 million in 2000. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, REPORT No. A-01-99-91002, AUDIT REPORT: PERFORMANCE
MEASURE REVIEW: RELIABILITY OF THE DATA USED TO MEASURE CONTINUING DISABILITY
REVIEWS (June 2000), at A5-A6. Our report takes no position on revisions to the CDR program.
15 Cf D. Gregory Rogers, The Effects of Social Security Awards on Long-Term Disability
Claims, 1 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1117 (July 2001).
Conversations with the SSAB have also created a suspicion that private insurance policies are
beginning to require appeals through the ALJ stage before payment of insurance benefits, but the
situation is too recent for data to have been compiled.
16 See SSA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 8 (FY 2002) [hereinafler KEY WORKLOAD
INDICATORS].
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changes in the Medicare laws, which make certain coverage
determinations subject to review by administrative law judges.17 Recent
caseload figures show that receipts by SSA ALJs are increasing. After
falling to a six-year low of 455,192 in FY 1999 the caseload was
491,404 in FY 2000 and 525,383 in FY 2002.18 These caseload realities
make it more difficult for the SSA to achieve decisions that are uniform,
fair, and timely.
In addition to the pressure of mounting caseloads, the Social
Security disability adjudication process has been affected by dramatic
increases in the percentage of claimants represented by counsel over the
last thirty years. According to the SSAB, the percentage of claimants
who are represented by counsel has nearly doubled since 1977, when
the percentage was approximately 36 percent.' 9 It then began a rather
rapid rise, reaching 48 percent in 198020 and 65 percent by fiscal year
1986.21 It now is around 70 percent, with 18 percent of claimants
assisted by non-attorney representatives. There is, however, a
substantial difference in rate of representation for Disability Insurance
("DI") claimants, as compared to Supplemental Security Income
("SSI") claimants. 22 As a practical matter, it is unusual for a DI
17 See generally GUIDE TO MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS
(Eleanor D. Kinney, ed. 2002) (Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice,
American Bar Association 2002). The question whether these adjudications will be heard by
ALJs at SSA or at the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") is a matter of current
controversy. See Non-ALJs in Medicare Hearings: A View of SSA's Future?, NOSSCR SOC.
SEC. FORUM. Vol. 25, No. 3 (March 2003). In April 2003, a committee of the House of
Representatives reported a bill that would effectuate a transfer of Medicare adjudications from
SSA to HHS. See H.R. 810, Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act of 2003, §403,
107th Cong. 1st Sess. The ABA House of Delegates has recently adopted a recommendation
urging, among other things, that beneficiaries continue to have the right to an ALJ hearing.
Interestingly, the recommendation urges that "[neither [HHS], nor its contractors, should be a
party to the ALJ hearing." It also urges that: "[t]he record should not be closed prior to the
hearing. After the ALJ hearing, beneficiaries should be provided the opportunity to reopen the
record for good cause." Adopted August, 2003 (quotation taken from proposed recommendation,
a telephone interview with Nancy Coleman, Executive Director of ABA Commission on Law and
Aging confirmed that the language was unchanged). While the ABA recommendation is not
inconsistent with the conclusions of this article pertaining to Social Security disability cases, it
does not address the central emphasis of this article-improving the record for decision. We
express no opinion on these issues with respect to Medicare claims adjudications.
18 See KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 16, at 5.
19 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND
MATERIALS 73 (Jan. 2001).
20 See HHS, Operational Report of the Office of Hearings and Appeals 25 (Sept. 30, 1986)
(reporting that 48% of claimants were represented by counsel and 15% by non-attorneys).
21 See id. The corresponding figure for non-attorneys was 18%.
22 SSI claimants are represented by attorneys in 45.9% of claims; the rate for DI claimants is
74.9%. These figures are attributed to SSA by the Federal Bar Association, Letter from Hon.
Kathleen McGraw, Chair, Social Security Section, Federal Bar Association to Hon. Clay Shaw,
Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Jan. 7, 2002)
(regarding H.R. 3332, the "Attorney Fee Payment System Improvement Act of 2001").
However, this figure was for attorney representation, and no figure was given for mixed DUSSI
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claimant who wants representation to be unrepresented and relatively
rare for SSI claimants as well.
This increase in claimant representation upsets the ALJ's "three hat
role" and has a bearing on whether the government should also be
represented at some point during the administrative appeals process. It
also renews questions about whether the administrative record should be
closed at a pre-ordained time (and, if so, when?).
A. Related Social Security Advisory Board Studies
The SSAB has already made general recommendations on the two
topics discussed in this article. In its 2001 report, Charting the Future
of Social Security's Disability System: The Need for Fundamental
Change, the Board explained its reasoning for suggesting that the
agency be represented at the hearing as follows:
First, the fact that most claimants are now represented by an
attorney reinforces the proposition, which has been made several
times in the past, that the agency should be represented as well.
Unlike a traditional court setting, only one side is now represented
at Social Security's ALJ hearings. We think that having an
individual present at the hearing to defend the agency's position
would help to clarify the issues and introduce greater consistency
and accountability into the adjudicative system. It would also help to
carry out an effective cross-examination of the claimant. Many ALJs
have told us that they are sometimes reluctant to conduct the kind of
cross-examination they believe should be made because, upon
appeal, the record may make them appear to have been biased
against the claimant. Consideration should also be given to allowing
the individual who represents the agency at the hearing to file an
appeal of the ALJ decision.
If the agency is represented at the hearing there are issues that
would have to be addressed, for example, who would have the
responsibility for performing that function. Whoever had the
responsibility would need substantially increased resources, at least
in the short run. However, if government representation resulted in
better-reasoned and justified decisions at the front end of the process,
as many believe would be the case, then over time the number of
appeals should go down, with savings to both the system and to
claimants. The problem of representation for claimants who do not
have it would also have to be addressed, but this is an issue that with
a good faith effort should be able to be worked out.
Close the record after the ALJ hearing.-Second, Congress and
cases. Nevertheless it seems clear that pure SSI cases are far less attractive for attorneys.
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SSA should review again the issue of whether the record should be
fully closed after the ALJ decision. Following legislation in 1980,
SSA issued a regulation that bars the submission of new evidence
that pertains to a period after the ALJ hearing decision, but allows
new evidence to be submitted if it relates to the period on or before
the date of the decision.23
Leaving the record open means that the case can change at each
level of appeal, requiring a de novo decision based on a different
record. SSA has no data on the percentage of cases that are
remanded back to ALJs that involve new evidence, but many ALJs
have told us that in their observation it is more than half and that it
adds substantially to their workload. They argue that leaving the
record open provides an incentive for claimants' representatives to
withhold evidence in order to strengthen an appeal at a later stage.
They also believe that it gives representatives an incentive to prolong
the case in order to increase their fees. Other ALJs do not believe
that representatives hold back evidence for these reasons. If
evidence is held back, they maintain, it is because the rules for
presenting evidence are lax and representatives do not take the time
or spend the money to obtain additional evidence unless required to
do so as a result of an unfavorable hearing decision.
Closing the record would heighten the need to develop the record
as fully as possible before the decision is made in order to ensure that
claimants are not unfairly penalized. Closing the record would not
preclude filing a new application.24
The following year, the General Accounting Office ("GAO")
reacted favorably to the SSAB report by recommending that SSA
"consider[]... some of the fundamental, structural problems as
identified by the Social Security Advisory Board."2 5
23 SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, CHARTING THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY'S
DISABILITY SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 19-21 (Jan. 2001), available at
http://www.ssab.gov/disabilitywhitepap.pdf. See also Hearing on Social Security Disability
Programs' Challenges and Opportunities. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Statement of the Hon.
Hal Daub Chairman] (statement of the Hon. Hal Daub Chairman, Social Security Advisory
Board, and former Member of Congress) (reiterating the recommendation on "having an
individual present at the hearing to defend the agency's position").
24 SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, CHARTING THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY'S
DISABILITY SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 23, at 20-21. See also
Statement of the Hon. Hal Daub Chairman, supra note 23 (reiterating the recommendation on
closing of the record).
25 United States General Accounting Office, Social Security Disability Disappointing Results
From SSA's Efforts to Improve the Disability Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, 29 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02322
.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report-Disappointing Results].
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B. Other Relevant Studies (Administrative Conference of the United
States)
The former Administrative Conference of the United States
("ACUS") undertook numerous studies relating to the appeals process
in the Social Security disability program and issued several
recommendations specifically involving the various levels of review.26
In 1978, ACUS issued a recommendation that addressed primarily the
administrative hearing stage of the disability benefit claim processing
and appeals process. 27 It reaffirmed the need for continued use of ALJs,
but it also made suggestions concerning the development of the
evidentiary hearing record. Those suggestions included
recommendations that ALJs take more care in questioning claimants,
seek to collect as much evidence prior to the hearing as possible, make
greater use of prehearing interviews, and make better use of treating
physicians as sources of information. Of most relevance to the present
study, ACUS also recommended closing of the record at the ALJ stage,
before review by the SSA Appeals Council. 28 In a 1990 supplementary
recommendation, ACUS addressed the need to have the evidentiary
record be as complete as possible, as early in the process as possible. 29
That recommendation advocated an increased use of subpoenas to make
this possible and, in conjunction with a provision in an earlier
recommendation, advocated the adequate compensation of physicians
26 See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html (detailing these recommendations).
Professor Verkuil was a member of ACUS, Professor Lubbers was ACUS's Research Director
from 1982-95, and Professor Bloch served as a consultant to ACUS on two research projects.
ACUS's operations ceased in October 1995. See also Symposium, Administrative Conf. of the
United States ("ACUS"), 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1-204 (1998).
27 Procedures for Determining Social Security Disability Claims, 43 Fed. Reg. 27, 508 (June
26, 1978). This recommendation was based largely on JERRY L. MASHAW, CHARLES L. GOETZ,
FRANK I. GOODMAN, WARREN F. SCHWARTZ, PAUL R. VERKUIL & MILTON M. CARROW,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (Lexington 1978). This study was done through the
National Center for Administration Justice, Milton Carrow, Director, and was led by Professor
Mashaw of the Yale Law School.
28 See Procedures for Determining Social Security Disability Claims, 43 Fed. Reg. 27,508
C(l) (June 26, 1978) C(1), stating the following:
The Appeals Council should exercise review on the basis of the evidence established in
the record before the administrative law judge. If a claimant wishes to offer new
evidence after the hearing record has been closed, petition should be made to the
administrative law judge to reopen the record. Where new evidence is offered when an
appeal is pending in the Appeals Council, the Appeals Council should make that
evidence a part of the record for purposes of the appeal only if a refusal to do so would
result in substantial injustice or unreasonable delay.
Id.
29 Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary Recommendation, 55
Fed. Reg. 34, 213 (Aug. 22, 1990).
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asked to provide medical information in disability proceedings. 30
ACUS also reiterated, in 1990, that the record before the ALJ should be
closed at a set time after the hearing and set forth a specific
recommended procedure.31
C. Related Social Security Administration Initiatives
In October 1982, the SSA began an "Adjudicatory Improvement
Project" ("AIP") at the Office of Hearings and Appeals ("OHA"). As
discussed more fully in Part IV, a centerpiece of this project was the
SSA's government representation experiment, known as the Social
Security Administration Representation Project ("SSARP"), which
lasted until a district court injunction was issued against the project in
1986. SSA decided not to appeal the decision, and revoked the
30 See Improved Use of Medical Personnel in Social Security Disability Determinations,
5(c), available at www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/3058910.html, discussed in 55 Fed. Reg.
34,212 (Aug. 22, 1990). This recommendation also urged enhanced use of medical personnel at
the initial decision level, better identification of conflicts over medical evidence, and heavier
reliance on medical experts at the ALJ stage. It also suggested that if these reforms were
instituted, the initial determination level should be a single step-with the elimination of the
separate reconsideration stage.
31 See Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary Recommendation,
55 Fed. Reg. 34, 213 at 4-5 (Aug. 22, 1990), describing the procedure as follows:
4. Closing of the Administrative Record: The administrative hearing record should be
closed at a set time after the evidentiary hearing. Prior to this, the ALJ should set forth
for the claimant what information the claimant needs to produce to complete the
record, issue any necessary subpoenas, and provide the claimant adequate time to
acquire the information. Requests for extension should be granted for good cause,
including difficulty in obtaining material evidence from third parties. The ALJ should
retain the discretion to accept and consider pertinent information received after closure
of the record and before the decision is issued.
5. Introduction of New Evidence After the ALJ Decision:
a. Upon petition filed by a claimant within one year of the ALJ decision or while
appeal is pending at the Appeals Council, the ALJ (preferably the one who originally
heard the case if he or she is promptly available) should reopen the record and
reconsider the decision on a showing of new and material evidence that relates to the
period covered by the previous decision. An ALJ's denial of such a petition should be
appealable to the Appeals Council.
b. Appeals Council review of an ALJ's initial decision should be limited to the
evidence of record compiled before the AL. Where the claimant seeks review of an
ALJ's refusal to reopen the record for the submission of new and material evidence,
the Appeals Council should remand the case of the ALJ (preferably the one who
originally heard the case if he or she is promptly available), if it finds that the ALJ
improperly declined to reopen the record. The Appeals Council should not review the
merits itself or issue a decision considering the new evidence, unless remand would
result in substantial injustice or unreasonable delay.
Id. In a footnote, the Conference noted that "Congress may at some time in the future need to
consider whether it may want to provide for judicial review of Appeals Council determinations
not to reopen the record." Id. at n.2.
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regulations governing the SSARP in May of 1987.32
A more substantive project known as the Process Unification
Initiative was begun in 1996. As described by SSA in 1997, the aim of
"Process Unification" was to foster use of the same adjudicative
standards by disability adjudicators at all levels of adjudication. More
specifically, the agency attempted to: (1) define the specific weight to
be given to DDS medical consultant opinions in hearing decisions; (2)
clarify the guidelines in its regulations used in determining whether an
individual lacks the capacity to perform less than a full range of
sedentary work; and (3) provide for pre-effectuation review of hearing-
level decisions made by OHA. Favorable decisions that appeared to be
unsupported by the evidence of record were to be forwarded to the
OHA Appeals Council for review. 33  A recent assessment of the
initiative by the Federal Bar Association concluded that it was not
accomplishing its purpose. 34
Another set of four procedural projects designed to improve the
disability decisionmaking process was started by SSA in 1994. A 2001
report by the GAO summarized those projects and concluded that
although SSA had spent more than $39 million over seven years on the
various initiatives, the results had "in general been disappointing." 35
Two of the projects, the Disability Claim Manager and the
Prototype, attempted to improve the initial claims process. The
Disability Claim Manager initiative created a new position intended to
perform the duties of both SSA field office claims representatives and
state Disability Determination Service ("DDS") disability examiners.
These managers were responsible for processing all aspects of a claim
for disability benefits, both medical and nonmedical, and were expected
to explain relevant program requirements and the disability adjudication
process to claimants and to serve as the claimants' primary point of
contact on their claims. The Prototype initiative attempted to ensure
that all legitimate claims were approved as early in the process as
possible. It required disability examiners to document and explain the
32 See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
33 See SSA Statement of Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, Unified
Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (October 1997), available at
http://ciir.cs.umass.edu/ua/Octoberl997/priority/pfile-23.html.
34 See Oral Statement: Before Subcomm. on Social Security of the U.S. House of
Representatives (2002) (oral statement of Hon. Kathleen McGraw, Chair, Social Security Section,
Federal Bar Association), stating as follows:
SSA's process unification initiative was intended to have everyone using the same
legal standards to decide the issue of disability. That still is not happening. At the
DDS, decisions are driven solely by the objective medical findings, with mere lip
service paid to the requirements of the law that claimants' subjective complaints such
as pain and fatigue be assessed.
Id.
35 GAO Report-Disappointing Results, supra note 25, at 1-2.
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basis for their decisions more thoroughly and it gave them greater
decisional authority for certain claims. It also eliminated
reconsideration of denials at the DDS level. The SSA has extended the
Prototype a number of times; most recently, it announced that the
Prototype would be continued at least through June 30, 2003 in order to
test various initiatives further, including the elimination of the
reconsideration level of review. 36
The other two initiatives-Hearings Process Improvement ("HPI")
and Appeals Council Process Improvement-were aimed at changing
the processes for handling appeals of claims denied by the DDS after
initial decision and reconsideration. Both initiatives were designed to
speed-up decisions made by ALJs and by the Appeals Council, and
thereby to reduce their backlogs of appealed claims. HPI attempted to
reduce the time it takes to get a decision on an appealed claim by
increasing the amount of analysis and screening done on a case before it
is scheduled for a hearing with an AL. In addition, the initiative
reorganized hearing office staff into small groups, called "processing
groups," to try to attain more accountability and control in the handling
of each claim.
The GAO reported that the results of the four initiatives were
mixed. In the Disability Claim Manager Initiative, which ran from
November 1999 to June 2001 at thirty-six locations in fifteen states,
claims were processed faster and customer and employee satisfaction
improved, but administrative costs were substantially higher. SSA's
own evaluation of the test concluded that the overall results were not
compelling enough to warrant additional testing or wide
implementation. In the "Prototype," which was implemented in ten
states in October 1999, preliminary results did show that the DDSs
operating under the Prototype are awarding a higher percentage of
claims at the initial decision level, while the overall accuracy of their
decisions is comparable with the accuracy of decisions made under the
traditional process. Moreover, appeals from denied claims in this
process reach a hearing office about seventy days faster than under the
traditional process because the Prototype eliminates the reconsideration
step in the appeals process. However, this was offset by an increase in
the rate of appeals, thus increasing backlogs. As a result, the SSA
decided in December 2001 that it would not extend the Prototype to
additional states in its current form. According to GAO, SSA plans to
reexamine the Prototype to determine what revisions are necessary to
decrease overall processing time and to reduce its impact on costs
before proceeding further.
The Hearings Process Improvement Initiative was implemented
36 See 67 Fed. Reg. 75, 895 (Dec. 10, 2002).
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nationwide in 2000. Unfortunately, according to the GAO, it has
slowed processing in hearings offices from 318 days to 336 days. And
finally, the Appeals Council Process Improvement Initiative was
implemented in fiscal year 2000 and has resulted in some
improvements. The time required to process a case in the Appeals
Council has been reduced by 11 days to 447 days and the backlog of
cases pending review has been reduced from 144,500 (fiscal year 1999)
to 95,400 (fiscal year 2001). GAO concluded that "[1]arger
improvements in processing times were limited by, among other things,
automation problems and policy changes." 37
As found by GAO, the results of the HPI initiative have been to
add 18 days to the time required for a decision in an appealed claim.38
It is not surprising, therefore, that the number of appealed Social
Security cases that were processed has decreased since the initiative's
implementation. In fiscal year 1999, 524,738 cases were decided; in
fiscal year 2001, this number had decreased 24.6 percent to 395,565
cases. This led to a backlog in cases pending a decision from 264,978
cases in September 1999 to 392,387 in September 2001. This increase
of 48.1 percent far exceeded the 5.7 percent rise in cases received by
hearing offices during the same period. 39 Fiscal Year 2002 figures show
that dispositions have increased again to 454,718, but the pending
caseload has jumped by over 70,000 to 463,052.40
GAO attributed this failure of the HPI initiative to an attempt to
implement these large-scale changes too quickly. This led to delays,
poorly timed and insufficient staff training, and the absence of
important automated functions. Specifically, there was a problem with
the slowing of the organization of case evidence (referred to as "case
pulling"), which reduced the number of case files ready for ALJ review.
This case-pulling backlog was due to personnel changes that were a
result of the initiative. These changes created a void of experienced
staff to organize and prepare case files for ALJ review. 4' Another
problem identified by GAO was "poorly timed and insufficient staff
training" of the 2000 individuals assigned new responsibilities under the
HPI. 42  Finally, problems encountered during the initiative's
implementation were exacerbated by the fact that the automated
functions necessary to support initiative changes never materialized. 43
GAO reported also that there was only mixed support for the
37 GAO Report-Disappointing Results, supra note 25, at 3-4.
38 See id. at 20.
39 See KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 16, at 5. Note that these figures differ from
GAO's because GAO includes Medicare cases.
40 See id.
41 GAO Report-Disappointing Results, supra note 25, at 21.
42 Id.
43 See id, at 22.
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initiative among ALJs. 44 Many ALJs indicated that the ALJ union was
organized in 1999 in response to the perception that SSA excluded them
in the formation of the HPI initiative. However, SSA officials disagreed
with this assertion and said that ALJs were included during the
formation of the initiative. 45
Finally, the difficulties SSA is experiencing under the HPI
initiative may also have been made worse by a freeze on ALJ hiring.
Since April 1999, this hiring freeze has prevented SSA from hiring new
ALJs to replace those who have retired. However, the hiring freeze was
temporarily lifted in September 2001, thereby allowing SSA to hire 126
ALJs. 46 At this writing, an appellate court has just reversed the
administrative decision that led to this hiring freeze, but it is unclear
how and when the hiring of ALJs by SSA will be reopened.4 7
SSA also introduced the Senior Attorney Program, a temporary
initiative in fiscal year 1995 to reduce OHA's backlog of appealed
cases. Under this program, which was phased out in 2000, selected
attorneys reviewed pending claims in order to identify those cases in
which the evidence already in the case file supported a fully favorable
decision. Senior Attorneys had the authority to approve those claims
without ALJ involvement. During its existence, the program succeeded
in reducing the backlog of pending disability cases at the hearing level
by issuing some 200,000 hearing-level decisions. However, GAO
reported that studies differed on the accuracy and quality of Senior
Attorney decisions.48 Moreover, "SSA management has expressed
concern that the Senior Attorney program [was] a poor allocation of
resources as it divert[ed] attorneys from processing more difficult cases
in order to process the easier cases. '49  One GAO interviewee
acknowledged that the program moved cases but raised questions about




47 On February 20, 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a decision by
the MSPB in which the Board concluded that the scoring formula used by the Office of Personnel
Management ("OPM") in 1996 to evaluate candidates for the position of ALJ violated OPM's
regulations and the Veterans' Preference Act because it gave too much weight to veterans'
preferences. The MSPB Chief Administrative Law Judge initial decision in Azdell v. OPM,
Docket No. DC-300A-97-0368-N-1, which ordered OPM to discontinue use of its 1996 scoring
formula for the ALJ examination, led OPM on April 22, 1999 to suspend the ALJ examination
and stop processing all pending ALJ applications. On October 20, 2000, in response to cross-
appeals, the Board ordered OPM to "reconstruct the ALJ registers and all certificates of eligibles
that were issued while the 1996 scoring formula was in effect." Azdell v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
87 M.S.P.R. 133-61 (2000), reconsideration denied, 89 M.S.P.R. 88 (2001). This is the decision
that was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Meeker v. Merit Sys.
Protection Bd., 319 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003), reh "g en banc denied (July 3, 2003).
48 See GAO Report-Disappointing Results, supra note 25, at 23.
49 See id. at 23-4.
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approved questionable cases to justify their role. Another said the
quality was variable but that in his experience Senior Attorneys failed to
develop the cases they did not approve as they were supposed to do.
On the other hand, the National Treasury Employees Union
("NTEU") has advocated a retention and expansion of the Senior
Attorney Program. It argues that:
[I]t is unreasonable to expect an Administrative Law Judge to
produce more than 500 dispositions in a year if an acceptable level of
quality is to be maintained. If ALJs are the only decision-makers,
unless the Agency is prepared to accept a much greater number of
ALJs than currently are employed, the simple arithmetic mandates an
ever increasing backlog and skyrocketing processing times. The
solution is more decision makers.50
Its president has expressed the view that the Senior Attorney
program was a "resounding success,"51 noting the following statistics
and conclusion:
Senior Attorneys issued approximately 220,000 decisions during the
course of the Program. The average processing time for Senior
Attorney decisions was approximately 105 days. During its pendency
the OHA backlog fell from over 550,000 to as low as 311,000 at the
end of FY 1999. The correlation is obvious.52
According to the NTEU, in July 1998, the Senior Attorney
Program was significantly downsized with approximately one-half of
the senior attorneys returned to the GS- 12 attorney adviser position:
Unfortunately, the number of Senior Attorneys was not increased
which led to a significant decline in the Program's productivity.
This decrease in productivity led to the rise in unpulled cases and the
beginning of the increase in the backlog and average processing
time. ... Had the Senior Attorney Program not been downsized, and
then eliminated, there would be about 90,000 fewer cases waiting to
be 'pulled.' 5 3
The NTEU also rebutted the criticisms relating to decisional
accuracy, and claimed that the Senior Attorneys were "experienced
OHA Attorney Advisors who have many years experience dealing with
the intricacies of the legal-medical aspects of the Social Security
disability program. '5 4 The National Organization of Social Security
Claimants' Representatives ("NOSSCR") expressed support for
50 Hearing Series on Social Security Disability Programs' Challenges and Opportunities:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Sececurity of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
107th Cong. (2002) (Statement of James A. Hill, President, Attorney-Advisor, Office of Hearings
and Appeals, Social Security Administration, Cleveland Heights, Ohio,
and President, National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 224).
51 Id at6.
52 Id. at 5.
53 Id. at 5-6.
54 Id. at 6.
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reinstating the Senior Attorney Program in a recent position paper on
improving the disability determination process, noting that the program
"was well received by claimants' advocates because it presented an
opportunity to present a case and obtain a favorable result efficiently
and promptly." 55 In that paper, NOSSCR observed more generally:
We support reinstating senior attorney authority to issue decisions in
cases that do not require a hearing and expanding ways that they can
assist ALJs. For instance, they also can provide a point person for
representatives to contact for narrowing the issues, pointing out
complicated issues, or holding prehearing conferences. 56
More recently, the SSA has taken additional steps to reduce
backlogs and to streamline the hearings process, subject to negotiation
with union officials. These include creating a law clerk position for
ALJs, allowing ALJs to issue decisions from the bench immediately
after a hearing, and including them in the early screening of cases for
immediate allowances.57 SSA announced a new set of proposed
reforms, also aimed in part in reducing the time for processing appeals,
in September 2003.58
II. DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS
This part begins with a brief analysis of the statutory disability
standard, including a description of how the Social Security
Administration implements that standard, and then describes disability
claim processing and the administrative appeals process in some detail.
A. The Statutory Disability Standard
The Social Security Act defines "disability" for purposes of DI and
SSI claims as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
55 National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives, Position Paper:
Improving the Disability Determination Process While Protecting Claimants' Rights 6-7 (Nov.
2002), available at http://www.nosscr.org/dibpaper.html.
56 Id. at 7.
57 See Hearings on Challenges Facing the New Commissioner of Social Security: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of Jo Anne B. Bamhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration).
58 See supra note 5.
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months." 59 The disability standard for SSI claims has slightly different
introductory language, so that the standard is phrased in terms of an
individual who is "unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. '60
However, the substance of the two standards is the same and they are
interpreted consistently as being essentially identical. 61 This standard
has three separate components: a severity requirement (the "inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity"); an origin requirement (the
disability must be based on a "medically determinable physical or
mental impairment"); and a duration requirement (qualifying
impairment must last at least one year or be expected to result in death).
Each of these requirements must be met; for example, a short-term
disability, no matter how severe, is not sufficient to establish eligibility
under the Act.
The severity requirement is defined further, so that an individual is
disabled "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are
of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy. '62 In other words, the inability to perform work that one has
done in the past is not sufficient; a claimant must be unable to do any
other work in the national economy, taking into account his or her age,
education, and prior work experience. Moreover, the issue is not the
claimant's ability to obtain employment, so long as there are jobs in the
national economy that he or she can perform. As stated in the Act, the
ability to perform substantial gainful activity is to be determined
"regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
[the claimant] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists..., or
whether [the claimant] would be hired. '63
59 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(I)(A) (2003).
60 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1974). There is a different disability standard in the SSI
program for children under the age of 18 that is not discussed separately in this report.
Originally, the standard was "any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of
comparable severity [to that of a disabled adult]." See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). In 1996,
following controversial litigation that culminated in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990),
and equally controversial regulations implementing the Court's decision in Zebley, Congress
amended the standard to its current language: "[a]n individual under the age of 18 shall be
considered disabled. . . if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations." 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (2000).
61 See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) (stating that both titles of the Social
Security Act define "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity); Perez v.
Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B) (2003).
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B) (2003). The phrase "work which exists in the
national economy" is defined further as "work which exists in significant numbers either in the
region where [the claimant] lives or in several regions of the country." Id.
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1. "Sequential Evaluation Process"
SSA uses a five-step "sequential evaluation process" to determine
if a claimant is disabled.64 This evaluation process is used for all DI
claims, and for all adult claims under the SSI program. A somewhat
different process-effectively, a truncated version of the regular
process-is used for claims by children for SSI benefits.65
The sequential evaluation process is used throughout the
administrative process, including appeals, and is fully accepted by the
courts as the framework for analysis of a Social Security disability
claim. 66 It is designed to test a claimant's evidence of disability at
different levels, each of which raise different factual and legal issues
relative to a finding of disability. The process operates somewhat like a
flow chart. At each level, depending on the facts, the claim is either
resolved (depending on the level, either with a finding that the claimant
is disabled or that the claimant is not disabled), or, if that finding cannot
be made, then the process continues to the next step. For evaluations
that reach the fifth and final level, the process again dictates a
conclusion whether the claimant is disabled or not, depending on the
facts.
In effect, the sequential evaluation process asks a series of
questions. The first question is whether the claimant is performing
substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is considered "not
disabled," regardless of his or her medical condition, and the process
ends.67 If the claimant is not currently engaging in substantial gainful
activity, the process moves to the second question, which is whether the
claimant has a "severe" impairment that significantly limits his or her
ability to perform work. If not, the claimant is considered not disabled
and the process ends there.68  If the claimant does have a severe
64 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003). Earlier regulations had used the term "sequential
evaluation process" to describe this procedure and that term is still widely used.
65 See id. § 416.926a (2003). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (2003) (stating that the
disability standard for children under the age of 18, a group eligible for disability benefits
uniquely thorough the SS1 program, is substantively different as well)- Although this difference
is highly significant relative to the ultimate decision on eligibility, the same basic disability
determination process is followed and therefore a child's SSI claims will not be discussed
separately here.
66 As one court stated, "[i]t is important for the [administrative law judge] to follow the
orderly framework set out in the [sequential evaluation regulations] to ensure uniformity and
regularity in outcome as well as fairness to the claimant." Mitchell v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp.
1084, 1087-88 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
67 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) ("If you are working and the work you are doing
is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled regardless of your medical
condition or your age, education, and work experience.").
68 See 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) ("If you do not have any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic
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impairment, the evaluation process continues on to a third question,
which asks whether the claimant's medical condition meets or equals
the requirements of SSA's Listing of Impairments. If so, the claimant is
considered disabled and the process stops. 69  If the claimant's
impairment does not meet the requirements of the Listing, the claim
continues to a fourth question, which asks a medical-vocational
question: Is the claimant prevented from performing his or her past
relevant work? If not, the claimant is considered not disabled and, once
again, the process stops. 70 If the claimant is prevented from performing
past relevant work, the process reaches the final question, which
addresses the ultimate medical-vocational standard for disability
benefits: considering the claimant's age, education, and prior work
experience: Can he or she perform other substantial gainful work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If such other
work exists, the claimant is not disabled; if such work does not exist,
then he or she is disabled.71
Generally, claimants have the burden of proof on the issue of
disability. 72 However, neither the Social Security Act nor the Social
Security regulations specify how the claimant's burden operates in the
work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not
disabled."). A denial at Step 2 is warranted only for claimants "with slight abnormalities that do
not significantly limit any 'basic work activity."' Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 158 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Soc. Sec. Rul. 85-28 (1985)). See also Chevalier v. Shalala,
874 F. Supp. 2, 5 (D.D.C. 1994) (citing same language and upholding denial benefits for failure
to show a severe impairment).
69 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) ("If you have an impairment(s) which meets the
duration requirement and is listed in [the Listing of Impairments] or is equal to a listed
impairment(s), we will find you disabled without considering your age, education, and work
experience."). See also infra note 74 (discussing the Listing of Impairments and the concept of
"medical equivalence" to a listed impairment).
70 See id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f) (2003), stating the following:
If we cannot make a determination or decision at the first three steps of the sequential
evaluation process, we will compare our residual functional capacity assessment ...
with the physical and mental demands of your past relevant work. If you can still do
this kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.
Id (citation omitted).
71 See id. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1) (2003):
If we find that you cannot do your past relevant work because you have a severe
impairment(s) (or you do not have any past relevant work), we will consider [our]
residual functional capacity assessment ... together with your vocational factors (your
age, education, and work experience) to determine if you can make an adjustment to
other work. If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find you not
disabled. If you cannot, we will find you disabled.
Id. (citation omitted). A different rule is applied at this step for claimants who did only "arduous
unskilled physical labor" for 35 years or more and with only a "marginal" education. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(g)(2), 416.920(g)(2) (2003). See also id. §§ 404.1562, 416.962 (2003).
72 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a) (2003). See also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)
(2003) ("An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such
medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may
require.").
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context of the sequential evaluation process. Nonetheless, case law
makes it clear that upon proof by a claimant that he or she cannot
perform prior work, the burden shifts to SSA to prove that the claimant
can perform other work available in the national economy. 73
The first two steps are designed to identify the most obvious
denials: claimants who are working and therefore are, by definition, not
"unable to perform substantial gainful activity" (Step 1) and those with
no impairments that significantly restrict their capacity to work (Step 2).
The third step is designed to simplify decisionmaking for the most
obviously eligible claimants: those with impairments that match (or
equal) the strict criteria set forth in the Listing of Impairments (Step
3).74 The last two steps take on the closer cases-those that cannot be
resolved through the first three steps-and address the more complex
medical-vocational aspects of the disability standard. Step 4 is still
relatively focused: Claimants who can perform jobs that they held in the
past-jobs that, by definition, are within their vocational competence-
are denied benefits on that ground.75 Only at Step 5 does the process
deal with the open-ended, ultimate question of whether the claimant can
perform any jobs at all, given his or her age, education, and work
experience.
For claims that reach Steps 4 and 5, the claimant is assigned a
residual functional capacity (often referred to as "RFC"), which
represents the level of work, if any, the claimant has the capacity to
perform. 76 Then, SSA decides whether, given the claimant's RFC, he or
she can perform prior relevant work and, if not, whether, considering in
addition his or her age, education, and prior work experience, a
significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the
claimant can perform.
73 See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146.
74 The Listing sets out physical and mental impairments that are "severe enough to prevent an
adult from doing any gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(a), 416.925(a). The claimant has
the burden of proof in providing the medical findings necessary to show that his or her
impairment meets a listing. Id. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a). In order to show that an impairment
(or combination of impairments) equal the requirements of the Listing, a claimant must present
"medical findings. .. at least equal in severity and duration to the listed findings." Id.
4 04 .1526(a), 4 16.926(a). See Soc. Sec. Rul. 9 6 -6 p (1996) (discussing the Administration's
position on medical equivalence).
75 This analysis can be more complicated. The Supreme Court granted certiorari recently in
a case where the court held that a claim could not be denied at Step 4 if the claimant's prior work
no longer exists, in the face of a dissenting opinion-and most earlier precedent-that saw a
claimant's prior work only as a standard for measuring work capacity. See Thomas v. Comm'r,
294 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. grantedsub nom. Bamhart v. Thomas, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003).
76 A claimant's RFC is based on his or her physical and mental limitations and measures how
they affect the claimant's ability to work; it is an evaluation of "what [the claimant] can still do
despite [those] limitations." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2003). There are five levels
of RFC: sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy work. See id. §§ 404.1567, 416.967
(2003); Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p (1996) (discussing the Administration's view on Residual
Functional Capacity assessments).
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2. The Medical-Vocational "Grid" Rules
Many claims are resolved at Step 5 through the use of a special set
of rules and tables, known as the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.77 The
heart of the Guidelines is the so-called "grids," which consist of three
tables. 7 Based on data from various government publications, 79 each
table has a set of "rules" consisting of three columns that account for a
claimant's age, education, and previous work experience, and a fourth
column that directs a decision of disabled or not disabled. Thus,
provided a claimant's vocational factors and residual functional
capacity coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule, that rule
directs a conclusion that the claimant is or is not disabled. For example,
if a claimant is limited to light work, is closely approaching advanced
age (defined as between the ages of fifty and fifty-four), is illiterate, and
has either no previous work experience or previous work experience
limited to unskilled labor, the grids would direct a finding that the
claimant is disabled.80 On the other hand, if that same claimant were at
least literate, then the grids would direct a finding that the claimant is
not disabled.8 1
The Supreme Court upheld the Guidelines in 1983 as valid rules
for determining disability. 82 The Court made it clear, however, that the
Guidelines' grids can be used to determine disability only where the
claimant's particular circumstances match each of the component parts
of the particular rule.83 When a claimant's RFC or relevant vocational
factors are different from those reflected in a particular grid rule, the
Guidelines cannot be used to meet the Administration's burden of
proof.84 In such cases, there must be proof that specific jobs exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
77 See 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P App. 2 (2003).
78 A claimant's RFC determines which table of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines is to be
used: Table I applies to individuals whose RFC limits them to sedentary work; Table 2 to those
limited to light work; and Table 3 to those limited to medium work. No tables exist for
individuals still able to perform heavy or very heavy work because the Guidelines state, in effect,
that regardless of their age, education, or work experience, sufficient jobs exist in the national
economy for such individuals to pursue substantial gainful activity. On the other hand, if it is
found that an individual is unable to perform work at even a sedentary level, he or she will be
assumed to be disabled, absent specific evidence to the contrary.
79 These include, most notably, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the Occupation
Outlook Handbook, both published by the Department of Labor. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart
P App. 2 § 200.00(b) (2003).
80 See 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P App. 2 § 202.09 (2003).
81 See id. Part 404 Subpart P App. 2 § 202.10 (2003).
82 See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
83 See id. at 462 n.5.
84 This policy is reflected in the Guidelines themselves. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P
App. 2 § 200.00(a) (2003).
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perform, given his or her impairments, age, education, and prior work
experience. Typically, this proof comes from a vocational expert, either
in a written report or, at the administrative hearing level, through live
testimony.
3. Other Special Rules
Apart from the sequential evaluation process and the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines, there are a number of special rules governing
medical evidence and how that evidence should be weighed in making
disability decisions. The most important of these rules are noted here
because they can have a significant impact on the disability
determination process. For example, SSA regulations provide that a
treating physician's opinion concerning the nature and severity of a
claimant's medical condition must be given "controlling" weight if the
opinion "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record. '85 If not given controlling
weight, the opinion may still be entitled to special weight according to a
series of factors, including some that focus on the treating relationship
and others that are directed more generally at all medical sources. 86
Regulations also provide that SSA may arrange for a consultative
examination if it is unable to obtain enough current medical information
from the claimant's medical sources to decide the claim. These
regulations include detailed provisions that outline when a consultative
examination can be purchased and when a treating physician should be
used to conduct the examination. 87
B. Disability Claim Processing and Appeals
Determining disability is but one component of an eligibility
decision on an application for benefits. Depending on the type of
benefit involved, various criteria unrelated to disability and common to
non-disability benefit claims (age, insured status, income and resources,
etc.) must be documented and evaluated before a final eligibility
decision is made. At the same time, SSA must, and does, process
claims for disability benefits differently than it does claims for other
types of benefits. This is the case, for example, at the very beginning of
the process: all claims for DI or SSI benefits start with an application
form that calls for general information intended to indicate what type of
85 Id. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (2003).
86 See id. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(6), 416.927(d)(2)-(6) (2003).
87 See id §§ 404.1519a, 404.1519b, 404.1519h, 416.919a, 416.919b, 416.919h (2003).
[Vol. 25:1
2003] SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY HEARINGS 23
benefits for which the claimant is most likely to be eligible. Although
the initial application form asks for some information specifically
relevant to disability claims that may lead to a decision on eligibility, 8 a
separate form, known as the "disability report," is added to the file once
the issue of disability surfaces. Similar accommodations to the special
needs of disability determinations are found throughout the application
and appeals process, most notably with respect to the gathering of
expert medical and vocational evidence.
The current Social Security decisionmaking process is complex, in
part because of the large numbers of claims and appeals, but also
because the vast majority of disputed claims involve disability
determinations. Deciding whether any one claimant is unable to engage
in "substantial gainful activity" in light of not only his or her physical
and mental impairments, but also any effects of age, education, and
prior work experience, can be difficult. Making disability
determinations fairly and accurately for millions of claims (and in
hundreds of thousands of appeals) is a daunting task. Some of the work
is facilitated by the disability regulations discussed above; the
"sequential evaluation process" and its components, including the
Listing of Impairments and the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, provide
important structure. The rest is left to the administrative process.
There are four levels of administrative decisionmaking for Social
Security claims-and for most claims, they must pass through each
before a decision is subject to judicial review. 89 The process begins at
local Social Security Administration offices, but the all-important
disability decisions are then contracted out to state-run DDS. SSA,
together with the DDSs for disability claims, makes the initial decision
on an application and the initial decision to terminate benefits; in case
of appeal, SSA and DDS also handle the first level of review, known as
"reconsideration." Further administrative appeals are handled by SSA,
but through the Office of Hearings and Appeals, which houses the
Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge who oversees
88 Information obtained on the initial form is used to determine the nature of the claimant's
physical and mental impairments, the date of onset of the alleged disability, and whether the
claimant performed any work after the alleged date of onset. If the claimant performed any work
after the onset date and that work is determined to be substantial gainful activity and is
continuing, the claim can be denied at the local office without having to evaluate the alleged
disability. See id. §§404.1520(b), 416.920(b) (2003) ("If you are working and the work you are
doing is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled regardless of your
medical condition or your age, education, and work experience.").
89 See, e.g., Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), "requires each Social Security claimant to exhaust his
administrative remedies before appealing to a federal district court"). There are special rules for
expedited appeals where the only issue is the constitutionality of an applicable provision of the
Social Security Act. See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.923- 404.928, 416.1423- 416.1428 (2003).
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approximately 1100 ALJs 90 who are responsible for administrative
hearings; and the Appeals Council (with a chair and twenty-eight
"Administrative Appeals Judges"), 9 1 which reviews administrative
hearing decisions on appeal by a claimant or on its own initiative.
1. Initial Decision on Application or Termination of Benefits
A claim for DI or SSI benefits must begin with an application filed
with the Social Security Administration. 92 Most applications are filed in
person or by telephone; however, the Administration also allows
applications to be filed on-line via the Internet.93 Most Social Security
Administration offices have "specialists" who assist claimants with the
application process and make sure that the applications are complete.
However, the most important work on a disability claim--determining
whether the claimant is disabled-is done at the state DDS.
When a claim is received by DDS, it is assigned to a disability
examiner who works together with a medical consultant to determine
whether the claimant is disabled and, if so, the date the disability began
(or, in termination cases, the date the disability ended). Disability
examiners do most of the evaluation; however, they must consult with
the medical consultant on medical equivalence and RFC.94
Although disability evaluations are made by the state DDS, the
final decision on eligibility for benefits is made at the local Social
Security Administration office.95  DDS's disability assessment is
followed in virtually all cases, but certain administrative findings are
identified as specially "reserved" to the Commissioner of Social
Security, including whether an impairment meets or equals a listing in
the Listing of Impairments and the claimant's RFC.96 Moreover, SSA
reviews a certain percentage of claims before any action is taken to
implement the eligibility decision.97 If approval is recommended, the
90 See KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 16, at 1 (providing the latest figures which
show 1082 ALJs on duty).
91 The number comes from a listing in the FEDERAL YELLOW BOOK 111-343 (Leadership
Directories, Inc., Summer 2003). These judges are not ALJs and lack the statutory independence
and APA protection enjoyed by ALJs.
92 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.610, 416.310 (2003).
93 This practice began in 2002. See https://s00dace.ssa.gov/pro/isba3/wwwrmain.shtm
(Social Security Online: Social Security Benefit Application) (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
94 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(b), 404.1546; 416.926(b), 404.946 (2003).
95 Technically, the Disability Determination Section's decision is a recommended decision
that need not be followed by the Administration. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503(d), 416.903(d)
(2003).
96 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e) (2003).
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 421(c)(1) (2003). Decisions not reviewed are implemented as
recommended by the DDS; those reviewed are either approved for implementation or returned to
the DDS for a new decision.
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file is returned to the local SSA office for processing payment. If the
decision is to deny the claim, SSA sends a notice explaining to the
claimant why the claim was denied and that a request for
reconsideration must be filed within sixty days of the denial.
2. Reconsideration
The first step in appealing an adverse decision is to request
"reconsideration. '98 Reconsideration is an internal examination of all
the evidence in the file at the time of the initial decision, together with
any additional evidence submitted subsequent to the initial decision.
Reconsideration takes place at the same DDS where the initial decision
was made; however, the disability examiner and medical consultant
who were involved in the initial determination cannot be involved at the
reconsideration stage. Only about 16 percent of DDS decisions are
reversed at reconsideration,99 and all reconsideration reversals are
reviewed at the appropriate Regional Office. Many reversals are based
on new medical evidence submitted subsequent to the initial decision.
Sometimes, claims that were denied because the duration requirement
was not met are reversed on reconsideration simply because of the
passage of time. A reversal may also result because of a better
definition or progression of the claimant's disability.
For denials of initial applications, reconsideration consists of a
review of the paper record, supplemented perhaps with additional
evidence, but without any face-to-face contact between the claimant and
the decisionmaker. There is, however, a separate reconsideration
procedure in CDR cases where existing benefits are terminated upon a
finding of nondisability based on medical factors.100 For these cases,
reconsideration includes a "disability hearing" held by a "disability
hearing officer."' 01
98 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909, 416.1409 (2003). It should be noted that Social Security
Commissioner, Jo Anne Barnhart, has proposed eliminating the reconsideration step as part of
effort to use DDS decision resources more effectively. Barnhart Statement, supra note 5.
99 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND
MATERIALS 86 (Jan. 2001).
100 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.914-18, 416.1414-18 (2003). See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(2),
1383(a)(7)(A) (2003).
101 According to information provided by Mike Brennan of the SSAB staff, such hearings last
about an hour and are conducted by non-ALJ adjudicators, chosen for their medical and
vocational knowledge who have been sent to a training program offered by McGeorge School of
Law.
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3. Administrative Hearing
The next level of appeal is an administrative hearing before an
ALJ. A claimant has sixty days from the date of receipt of a
reconsideration notice to request an administrative hearing, unless the
time limit is extended for good cause.102 If the claimant requests a
hearing, one will be held unless the AU decides to issue a fully
favorable decision without a hearing, or to remand for further
administrative action because the AU believes that a revised decision
will be favorable to the claimant. The AU may also dismiss the appeal
on certain specified grounds. 103
The AU is the only decisionmaker in the entire application and
appeals process that sees the claimant in person. 10 4 Before the hearing
takes place, the AU decides whether the evidence in the file is adequate
to resolve the issues or whether factual development of some type is
necessary. The AU also decides what additional evidence is necessary,
if any, and whether a vocational expert or medical expert should be
called to appear at the hearing. As part of this process, the AU can
order a consultative examination of the claimant through the DDS, and
must do so if such an examination is necessary to complete the medical
record. 0 5  The AU may also refer the case for prehearing
proceedings. 106
The hearing itself is informal and non-adversarial. Although the
practice varies by hearing office, most SSA ALJs do not wear robes.
Typically, the AU will ask a series of questions and then, if the
claimant is represented, the claimant's representative will continue the
questioning. Most hearings last approximately one hour; however, they
can range from as little as thirty minutes to more than two hours.
Typically, an AL will schedule about six hearings in a full day.
Following the hearing, the AU must issue a formal written decision that
includes a recitation of the evidence considered, findings of facts, and
detailed reasons for the decision.10 7
102 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.933(b), 416.1433(b) (2003).
103 See id. §§ 404.957, 416.1457 (2003).
104 An exception to this rule exists in certain cases where benefits were terminated. See supra
notes 101 - 103 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., Baca v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D.N.M. 1995).
106 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.942, 416.1442 (2003).
107 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.953, 416.1453 (2003).
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4. Appeals Council
A claimant who is dissatisfied with the decision of the ALJ
following an administrative hearing has one final opportunity for
administrative review at the SSA's Appeals Council. A request for
review by the Appeals Council must be filed within sixty days of receipt
of the hearing decision, unless the time limit is extended for good
cause. 10 8 The Appeals Council also reviews decisions on its "own-
motion," through both random and selective sampling that identifies
cases "that exhibit problematic issues or fact patterns that increase the
likelihood of error." 109
The Appeals Council can grant or deny the request for review; if
the petition for review is granted, the Council will either issue a
decision or remand the case for further administrative action."10 Social
Security regulations list four grounds for review: an abuse of discretion
by the ALJ; an error of law in the administrative hearing decision; the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence; or the decision
presents "a broad policy or procedural issue that may affect the general
public interest."' I  The Appeals Council denies review in 74 percent of
the appeals.' 1 2 If review is granted, a claimant may request an oral
argument; however, in most cases a decision or remand order is issued
at the same time the Council grants review. The Council can also
dismiss an appeal if not timely filed or under other limited
circumstances.113
When a claimant seeks Appeals Council review of an ALJ
decision, the entire claim is subject to review. This is certainly the case
where the claimant requests a general review of an unfavorable
decision. Full review by the Appeals Council is also appropriate where
the claimant has requested review on certain issues in a partially-
favorable decision, at least so long as the claimant was notified that a
request for review of a partially favorable decision could lead to a full-
scale review.1 14
108 See id. §§ 404.968, 416.1468 (2003). See also Bamhart Statement, supra note 5
(proposing to replace the Appeals Council with a newly constituted "Oversight Panel").
109 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.969(b), 416.1469(b) (2003). Social Security regulations provide further
that "[njeither our random sampling procedures nor our selective sampling procedures will
identify cases based on the identity of the decisionmaker or the identity of the office issuing the
decision." Id §§ 404,969(b)(1), 416.1469(b)(1) (2003).
110 See id. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (2003).
111 Id. §§ 404.970(a), 416.1470(a) (2003).
112 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND
MATERIALS 73 (Jan. 2001).
113 See 20 C.F.R. § §404.971,416.1471 (2003).
"14 See, e.g., Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1183 (3d Cir. 1992), reh 'g denied, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 19009 (3d Cir. Aug. 13, 1992) (finding that where claimant sought review only
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As discussed in more detail later in this article,' 15 a claimant may
submit "new and material" evidence to the Appeals Council together
with a request for review. If "new and material evidence" is submitted,
the Council will evaluate the entire record--consisting of the record
from the administrative hearing and any new and material evidence
submitted with the notice of appeal-and will grant a request for
review, if the AL's decision is "contrary to the weight of the evidence
currently in the record."'"16
A decision by the Appeals Council, either to deny a request for
review or, following the granting of a request for review, to affirm,
modify, or reverse the hearing decision, is a final decision by the Social
Security Administration, subject to judicial review. However, if the
case is remanded for further action by an AL, there is no final decision
and the administrative process continues.
iii. COMPILING THE RECORD FOR DECISION: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES
The key to fair and accurate disability determinations lies in the
quality of the record on which such decisions are made. Developing a
comprehensive record for Social Security disability claims is difficult
because the Social Security disability standard requires an assessment of
often-complex and frequently changing medical and vocational
evidence. Moreover, the information most relevant to a disability
decision may be subjective and in dispute, requiring the decisionmaker
to weigh and resolve conflicting evidence. It is not surprising,
therefore, that some of the most important rules and regulations
governing disability determinations address the development of the
record for decision and that much of the controversy about the current
multi-level disability determination process and the personnel involved
in that process revolves around the same concern.
This part of the article provides an overview of current SSA
regulations and practices relative to the evidentiary record for disability
claims and appeals. The first two subsections discuss the process for
developing the record and the rules on closing the record to additional
evidence. These two aspects of regulating the evidentiary record reflect
sometimes-competing policy interests. Specifically, if a full and
complete record is the key to fair and accurate disability decisions,
agency procedures should facilitate the development of all relevant
evidence and continue to do so until a final decision is reached. On the
of onset date, the Appeals Council reviewed entire record and denied benefits altogether).
115 See infra Part III.B.2.
116 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b) (2003).
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other hand, however, if record-based disability decisions are to be
subject to review, then review of those decisions should be based on the
same evidentiary record as was the decision under review. This tension
would not pose a problem if there were a clear line between making a
decision and reviewing a decision on appeal. That line is blurred,
however, in the Social Security disability determination process-
particularly, at the later stages of administrative review. Thus, federal
regulations provide:
In each step of the review process, [claimants] may present any
information [that claimants] feel is helpful to [their] case. Subject to
the limitations on Appeals Council consideration of additional
evidence . . ., [SSA] will consider at each step of the review process
any information [claimants] present as well as all the information in
[SSA's] records.] 17
A third subsection discusses the rules on attorneys' fees for Social
Security cases and how they relate to the matters covered in this article.
A. Developing the Record
Overall, SSA regulations and practices are aimed at compiling a
full and complete record. Certainly many individual claim files are
developed as fully as needed, often with little difficulty. However,
when a claim is developed poorly it affects not only the quality of the
decision at that level but it also burdens the next level of decision or
appeal. Because the Social Security disability determination process is
spread over up to four levels of administrative decision and appeal,
there is a tendency to put off the time-consuming and often tedious
work of searching for and obtaining relevant records to the next stage of
the process, and to avoid it altogether if the resulting denied claim is not
appealed. The rules and practices relative to development of the record
at each of the four levels of the disability determination process (initial
decision and reconsideration, administrative hearing, and Appeals
Council) are described below.
1. Initial Decision and Reconsideration: The Disability Determination
Service Stage
Although the Social Security claim process begins at local SSA
offices, relatively little work is done there on a disability claim file. The
117 Id. §§ 404.900(b), 416.1400(b) (2003). The rules concerning the consideration of
additional evidence at the Appeals Council mentioned in this regulation are discussed below. See
infra Part IIl.B.2.
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initial application form requires that claimants identify the medical basis
for any disability, state how any impairments affect their ability to
perform work and to participate in daily activities, and provide
information about relevant medical records and various sources of
medical evidence. However, the local office staff looks only at the first
step of the sequential evaluation process. Unless the claim can be
denied because the claimant is currently engaging in "substantial gainful
activity," the file is forwarded to the state DDS where the serious record
development work begins.
Initially, the responsibility for developing the evidentiary record
rests with the claimant. 18 This is consistent with the basic notion that
claimants have the burden of proof on the issue of disability, which
means that claimants must identify their impairments and provide the
evidence necessary for SSA to determine whether those impairments
establish that the claimant is disabled. 1 9 At the same time, SSA
recognizes that it has a responsibility to develop the record once a
claimant provides the basic information. Regulations provide that the
agency will develop a claimant's "complete medical history" for the
relevant time period. 120 Thus, although claimants are responsible for
providing their own evidence, SSA is expected to participate in
developing the record.
In particular, SSA will obtain medical records from a claimant's
identified medical sources and will pay for records it requests. 12' This
practice follows from a series of statutory and regulatory provisions that
require SSA to "make every reasonable effort" to obtain medical
information from claimants' treating sources and to weigh treating
source opinions appropriately.122 SSA is also authorized to order a
consultative examination if the claimant's medical sources cannot, or
will not, provide the evidence needed to make a decision on the claim,
118 See id. § 404.704 (2003) ("When evidence is needed to prove your eligibility or your right
to continue to receive benefit payments, you will be responsible for obtaining and giving the
evidence to us.").
119 See id. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a) (2003), stating the following:
In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or disabled. This means that you
must furnish medical and other evidence that we can use to reach conclusions about
your medical impairment(s). If material to the determination whether you are blind or
disabled, medical and other evidence must be furnished about the effects of your
impairment(s) on your ability to work, or if you are a child, on your functioning, on a
sustained basis. We will consider only impairment(s) you say you have or about which
we receive evidence.
Id See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(c), 416.912(c) ("You must provide medical evidence
showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it is during the time you say that you are
disabled.").
120 Id. §§ 404.1512(d), 416.912(d) (2003).
121 See id §§ 404.1512(d), 404.1514, 416.912(d), 416.914 (2003).
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B) (2003). See also supra Part l1.A.3. (discussing the rules on
weighing medical source opinions).
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and SSA will pay for any such examination it orders. 2 3 SSA retains the
right, however, to decide a claim on the basis of whatever information is
available if the claimant does not provide information requested. 124
As noted earlier, 25 DDS disability examiners work together with
medical or psychological consultants. Although the disability examiner
and the consultant share the responsibility for making the disability
decision, the disability examiner usually takes the lead with respect to
record development. After reviewing the file, the examiner decides if
additional evidence is needed and, if so, from which medical sources
additional information will be requested. Most requests are made to
traditional medical sources, such as doctors and medical facilities;
however, depending on the nature of the claim, requests may also be
made to nonmedical sources, such as family members, social workers,
and, for disabled children's SSI claims, teachers and daycare workers. 26
Although disability examiners usually decide whether to contact a
particular medical source, examiners will seek advice from the medical
consultant if the claim presents unusual evidentiary issues.
SSA follows essentially the same procedures for reconsideration as
for the initial decision, except that the process begins with an existing
file and different examiners and consultants are used. There is,
however, one major difference in termination cases where a beneficiary
is found to no longer be disabled due to medical reasons. Under those
circumstances, the beneficiary can request a face-to-face "disability
hearing" as part of the reconsideration process. 127
2. Administrative Hearing: The Administrative Law Judge Stage
The administrative hearing record begins with the evidence
compiled by the DDS during the initial processing of the claim,
including reconsideration, which DDS forwards to OHA. The ALJ,
working together with OHA staff, then reviews and develops the record
independently, without assuming that the DDS obtained all of the
information available at the time it made its decisions. In addition to
123 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517, 416. 917 (2003).
124 See id. §§ 404.1516 (2003) (stating that "[i]f you do not give us the medical and other
evidence that we need and request, we will have to make a decision based on information
available in your case."). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1516, 416.916 (stating that "[w]e will not
excuse you from giving us evidence because you have religious or personal reasons against
medical examinations, tests, or treatment.").
125 See supra Part II.B.I.
126 See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913 (2003) (identifying sources that can provide
evidence of an impairment). Non-medical sources are particularly appropriate for a child's SSI
claims where the issue is "functional equivalence" of a listed impairment. See also Id. § 416.926a
(2003).
127 See generally Id. §§ 404.914, 416.1416 (2003).
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new material submitted by the claimant, OHA staff can obtain existing
medical reports from treating sources or hospitals and can order
consultative examinations. Sometimes the evidence obtained at the
administrative hearing stage could not have been obtained earlier, either
because the claimant was not aware of a previously existing condition
or the claimant's condition changed since the last DDS decision was
made. However, OHA often obtains medical records and reports that
could have been obtained by the DDS in time for the initial decision. 28
Once the claimant's file has been completed, the case is set for
hearing unless the AU decides to issue a favorable decision without a
hearing or to remand the claim for further evaluation at the DDS agency
level. At the hearing itself, claimants, on their own or through their
representatives, 2 9  can present any testimony and additional
documentary evidence they wish.
3. Final Administrative Appeal: The Appeals Council Stage
The Appeals Council reviews factual findings only to assure that
they are supported by substantial evidence. However, if additional
evidence is submitted to the Council, it will review findings to
determine if they are "contrary to the weight of the evidence" in the
record, including the new evidence. 130 As discussed below in the
context of closing the record, additional evidence can be submitted to
the Appeals Council only if it is "new and material", and only if it
relates to the claimant's condition up to the date of the administrative
decision.
Apart from evidence submitted by the appellant, there is very little
additional development of the evidentiary record at the Appeals Council
level. The Appeals Council disposes of virtually all cases on the basis
of the written record, even when cases are accepted for review. There is
a small medical support staff that may be consulted about further
development of the medical record; however, if serious medical
questions are raised, the Council usually will remand the claim back to
the ALJ.13' Moreover, the Council may remand the claim a second time
128 Under current regulations, this same practice can continue through to the Appeals Council.
See infra Part HI.B.2.
129 As mentioned earlier, the rate of claimant representation by attorneys is now about 70%,
with 18% of claimants represented by non-attorneys. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
130 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (2003).
131 See id. §§ 404.977(a), 416.1477(a) (2003), stating the following:
The Appeals Council may remand a case to an administrative law judge so that he or
she may hold a hearing and issue a decision or a recommended decision. The Appeals
Council may also remand a case in which additional evidence is needed or additional
action by the administrative law judge is required.
Id. See also id. §§ 404.976(b)(2), 416.1476(b)(3) (2003), stating the following:
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if it appears that new evidence is still needed following a remand. 32
B. Closing the Record and Reopening Decisions
The concept of "closing" a record arises in two very different
contexts: preparing a record for decision and preserving a record of
decision for review. The process of preparing a record for decision
usually continues until the decision is reached; the record is closed at
the time (or just before) the decision is made. This is what happens at
the first two levels of disability claim processing: the initial decision
and reconsideration. As described above, the DDS is charged first with
developing the record to the point that a competent disability decision
can be made. Then, once the record is complete, the DDS makes its
decision based on the record it compiled. Closing the record does not
become a real issue until the ALJ stage.
1. Closing the Record at the Administrative Law Judge Stage
If a reconsideration decision is appealed, the record compiled at the
DDS is sent to the OHA and becomes the core record for the
administrative hearing. As noted above, the ALJs and OHA staffs then
continue developing the record, as needed. In addition, the claimant-
appellant is also free to submit additional evidence both before the
hearing133 and at the hearing itself.' 34  This must be so, as the
administrative hearing is a de novo review of the claim and the ALJ is
If additional evidence is needed, the Appeals Council may remand the case to an
administrative law judge to receive evidence and issue a new decision. However, if the
Appeals Council decides that it can obtain the evidence more quickly, it may do so,
unless it will adversely affect your rights.
Id.
132 See id. §§ 404.977(e)(2), 416.1477(e)(2) (2003), stating that after receiving a
recommended decision on remand:
If the Appeals Council believes that more evidence is required, it may again remand
the case to an administrative law judge for further inquiry into the issues, rehearing,
receipt of evidence, and another decision or recommended decision. However, if the
Appeals Council decides that it can get the additional evidence more quickly, it will
take appropriate action.
Id.
133 Indeed, claimants are expected to identify additional evidence that will be submitted
already at the time they request the hearing. See id. §§ 404.933(a)(3), 416.1433(a)(4) (2003)
("You should include in your request... [a] statement of additional evidence to be submitted and
the date you will submit it.").
134 See id. §§ 404.950(a), 416.1450(a) (2003) ("Any party to a hearing has a right to appear
before the administrative law judge, either in person... to present evidence and to state his or her
position. A party may also make his or her appearance by means of a designated
representative .... ).
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directed specifically to decide the claim "based on evidence offered at
the hearing or otherwise included in the record."'135 Moreover, the ALJ
has an affirmative duty to assure that the record, including any live
testimony offered by claimants and their witnesses, includes all of the
information necessary to decide the case. 136 Thus, Social Security
regulations provide that "[a]t the hearing, the administrative law judge
looks fully into the issues, questions [the claimant] and the other
witnesses, and accepts as evidence any documents that are material to
the issues."'137
Although less clearly stated and perhaps subject to some
conditions, the record may still remain open even after the hearing.
Sometimes, the claimant will request additional time to obtain evidence
and the ALJ will simply hold the record open for a set number of days
after the conclusion of the hearing in order to give the claimant time to
do so. The ALJ may also continue the hearing to a later date, pending
receipt of additional evidence, or may reopen the hearing if additional
evidence becomes available before the decision is issued. 138
2. Submitting New Evidence at the Appeals Council
A claimant may submit additional evidence to the Appeals Council
that will be considered together with the record from the hearing;
however, the evidence must be "new and material" and it must relate to
the time period relevant to the administrative hearing decision. 139 New
evidence that is relevant only to the claimant's condition after the date
of the hearing decision can be considered only in relation to a new
application covering a new period of disability. 140 It can be very
135 Id. §§ 404.953(a), 416.1453(a) (2003).
136 See, e.g., Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Even when a
claimant is represented by counsel, an 'ALJ has a basic obligation in every social security case to
ensure that an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the
issues raised."') (quoting Henrie v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 13 F.3d 359, 361 (10th
Cir. 1993)).
137 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, 416.1444 (2003).
138 See id. §§ 404.944, 416.1444 (2003), stating the following:
The administrative law judge may stop the hearing temporarily and continue it at a
later date if he or she believes that there is material evidence missing at the hearing.
The administrative law judge may also reopen the hearing at any time before he or she
mails a notice of the decision in order to receive new and material evidence.
See also Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Litigation Law Manual
[hereinafter "HALLEX"] § 1-2-680(C) ("If an AL decides to admit additional evidence into the
record of a case, or to conduct a supplemental hearing, he or she must reopen the record.").
139 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.976(b), 416.1476(b) (2003).
140 See id §§ 404.976(b)(1), 416.1476(b)(1) (2003), stating the following:
If you submit evidence which does not relate to the period on or before the date of the
administrative law judge hearing decision, the Appeals Council will return the
additional evidence to you with an explanation as to why it did not accept the
[Vol. 25:1
2003] SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY HEARINGS 35
important for a claimant to be able to submit additional evidence
concerning the time period covered by the administrative hearing
decision because under the doctrine of administrative res judicata, any
new application covering the same time period will be bound by an
earlier finding of nondisability for that period. 141
Although it seems clear that the Appeals Council must include any
properly submitted new evidence that meets the "new and material"
standard when deciding whether to grant a request for review, there is
some disagreement as to whether such evidence can be considered by
the courts when the Appeals Council refuses to grant review. Some
circuits have held that such evidence is not part of the administrative
record because the decision reviewed in the courts is the decision of the
ALJ based only on the evidence that was submitted at the hearing.
According to this position, the district court may consider new evidence
even for this purpose only if it satisfies a stricter standard, mentioned
below, for submitting "new and material" evidence to the court. 142
Other courts have ruled that any additional evidence submitted to the
Appeals Council is properly part of the administrative record before the
court, which means that the court can consider that evidence for
purposes of substantial evidence review. 143
Federal court review of SSA's final decision is based exclusively
on the record developed at the administrative hearing or before the
Appeals Council; new evidence in support of the claim cannot be
introduced at the district court. However, if a claimant comes across
"new" and "material" evidence after the administrative process is
complete and can show "good cause" for failing to submit it earlier, the
evidence can be presented to the court as a basis for remand. 1"
additional evidence and will advise you of your right to file a new application.
Id. If a new application for Disability Insurance benefits is filed within six months, the date of
the request for Appeals Council review will be used as the filing date for the new application. Id.
§ 404.976(b)(1) (2003). For SSI claims, the date of the Appeals Council request is used as the
filing date only if the new application is filed within sixty days. Id. § 416.1476(b)(1) (2003).
141 See Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that an earlier final
decision is a basis for denying subsequent applications involving the same facts and issues
existing at the time of the first decision).
142 See, e.g., Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001), stating the following:
[W]hen the Appeals Council has denied review... [and]... when the claimant seeks
to rely on evidence that was not before the ALJ, the district court may remand to the
Commissioner but only if the evidence is new and material and if there was good cause
why it was not previously presented to the AL.
Id.
143 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The newly submitted
evidence thus becomes part of the 'administrative record,' even though the evidence was not
originally included in the ALJ's record.") (citations omitted).
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (2003).
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3. Reopening a Decision
As noted earlier, one can always file a new application for a new
period of disability despite a final adverse decision on an earlier claim.
Rather than simply reapply for benefits, a claimant can request that an
earlier application be reopened. It is important to note, however, that
filing a new application leaves the earlier decision in place. Therefore,
to the extent that the new application overlaps with the earlier one, such
as where the claimant's insured status has lapsed and he or she must
prove onset during part of the period covered in the earlier application,
the claimant can be bound by the earlier finding of nondisability
through the operation of administrative res judicata.145 An application
can be reopened on SSA's own initiative as well. 1 46
There are three separate sets of criteria for reopening, defined by
the time period within which a request to reopen is filed or the decision
to reopen is made by SSA. The criteria are as follows: within one year
of the date of the decision, "for any reason"; within four years for
Disability Insurance benefits or within two years for Supplemental
Security Income, upon a showing of "good cause" (that includes the
furnishing of "new and material" evidence). 147 In addition, a case may
be reopened if, at any time, the decision "was obtained by fraud or
similar fault" or under certain other specific, limited circumstances
dealing primarily with errors unrelated to disability determination. 148
However, SSA is not required to reopen a claim; the regulations state
only that SSA "may" reopen a claim under one of the prescribed
conditions. Moreover, a refusal to reopen is not subject to either
administrative or judicial review. 149
A reopened application is reviewed and revised, if appropriate,
based on the evidence in the record and any supplemental evidence
submitted by the claimant or obtained by the Administration. A revised
decision can be appealed in the same manner as any other decision. 50
145 See, e.g., Drummond v. Comm'r, 126 F.3d 837, 842-43 (6th Cir. 1997).
146 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987, 416.1487 (2003).
147 id. §§ 404.988,416.1488 (2003).
148 See id. §§ 404.988, 416.1488. A misstatement on an application can constitute "similar
fault" for these purposes where the claimant knew that the information was incorrect; Heins v.
Shalala, 22 F.3d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1994). Until recently, there was some doubt as to whether
SSA can reopen claims according to the same criteria as claimants. However, 1994 regulations
make it explicitly clear that SSA may reopen claims on its own initiative according to the same
criteria as those applicable to requests by claimants. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 8,532 (1994); 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.987(b), 416.1487(b) (2003).
149 There is an exception for judicial review, if the refusal gives rise to a "colorable"
constitutional claim. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
150 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.993, 416.1493 (2003).
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C. Attorney's Fees
There are several sources of attorney's fees in Social Security
cases. Most awards by far are paid out of the claimant's benefits
pursuant to the Social Security Act and federal regulations. 151 Another
significant source of fees is the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), a
government-wide fee-shifting statute that authorizes the payment of fees
out of agency funds under limited circumstances. Congress chose to
regulate the collection of attorney's fees paid by claimants in order to
achieve the potentially conflicting goals of encouraging capable
attorneys to represent Social Security claimants and preventing
attorneys from receiving excessive contingent fees. 52 The EAJA has a
different purpose: to hold the government accountable for the cost of
representation when a citizen or small business successfully litigates
against the government on an issue that probably shouldn't have been
litigated in the first place.
The rules concerning both types of fees are relevant to the issues
covered in this article. Fees paid by claimants are tied to a significant
degree to the amount of past-due benefits awarded when a claim is
granted; as delay will increase the amount of past-due benefits, this can
add a perverse incentive to the process. EAJA fees are available
currently in Social Security cases only if the claimant prevails against
SSA in court.153 With respect to the administrative process, the EAJA
applies only to "adversary" proceedings; therefore, introducing a
government representative (a potential adversary) at the administrative
hearing could increase substantially the awarding of EAJA fees in
Social Security cases.
1. Fees Available under the Social Security Act
A request for fees under the Social Security Act for representation
of a claimant at an administrative hearing or before the Appeals Council
must be made in writing; the request must be detailed, and must include
a complete list of services performed and the amount of time spent. 154
151 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 406, 1383(d)(2) (2003); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1720-35, 416.1520-
35 (2003).
152 See generally Pappas v. Bowen, 863 F.2d 227, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1988); Dawson v. Finch,
425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1970).
153 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2003). To a limited extent, EAJA fees may be awarded for
administrative representation following a remand by fcderal court. See infra text accompanying
notes 165-66.
154 The factors included in evaluating a fee request are the type and amount of services
performed, the difficulty of the case, including the skill required of the representative, and the
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Another option is for a claimant and his or her representative to agree
on a fee, which cannot exceed 25 percent of the claimant's past-due
benefits or $5,300, whichever is less. The agreed fee will be awarded
automatically unless objected to by the claimant, the representative, or
the agency. 155
SSA will withhold up to 25 percent of past-due benefits for direct
payment to attorneys in DI cases. 156 Effective February 1, 2000,
Congress imposed a "user fee" on attorneys whose fees are paid out of
withheld past-due benefits; the user fee comes out of the approved
attorney's fee and is not an additional cost to the claimant. 15 7 SSA's
authority to set the amount of an attorney's fee award operates
separately from the direct payment program. Thus, a fee can be
authorized for an amount greater or smaller than the amount that can be
withheld and paid directly; indeed, SSA can authorize a fee even when
no past-due benefits would be due. There is no authority for
withholding benefits for fees in SSI cases. 158
Courts can also award fees for representation in judicial
proceedings in DI cases. The Social Security Act limits the amount of
an attorney's fee for court litigation in DI cases to a maximum of 25
percent of past-due benefits. 59 Fees for SSI cases in court are governed
by SSA regulations, but not by the Social Security Act.' 60
2. Fees Available under the Equal Access to Justice Act
The EAJA permits prevailing parties to obtain awards of attorney
fees and other expenses against the United States in certain
administrative proceedings and judicial actions, if the government's
action is found not to be substantially justified. 161
The Act applies to cases where the SSA claimant prevails in
results achieved. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1725, 416.1525 (2003).
155 See 67 Fed. Reg. 2477 (2002); HALLEX, supra note 138, at 1-1 -2-12.
156 See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (2003); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1720, 404.1725 (2003).
157 42 U.S.C. § 406(d) (2003).
158 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1520 (2003).
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (2003).
160 Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.1540(b) (2003) with 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2) (2003).
161 See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2003), providing that:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party
other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in
connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that
the position of the agency was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust. Whether or not the position of the agency was substantially
justified shall be determined on the basis of the administrative record, as a whole,
which is made in the adversary adjudication for which fees and other expenses are
sought.
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federal court. 162 But with limited exceptions, it has not applied to the
SSA administrative hearing process because the Act limits coverage to
"adversary adjudications," which are defined to include adjudications
"under [5 U.S.C. §554] in which the position of the United States is
represented by counsel or otherwise .... ,"163 This raises the question
whether the use of government attorneys in SSA disability proceedings
would trigger broader EAJA applicability in SSA administrative
adjudication.
Attorney's fees may now be awarded under the EAJA for
representation in administrative hearings in Social Security disability
proceedings only in certain limited situations-involving cases
remanded by the federal courts. In Sullivan v. Hudson, 64 the Supreme
Court held that while EAJA attorney's fees may not be recovered for
typical SSA administrative proceedings-since such proceedings are
not adversarial-attorney's fees may be granted when a Social Security
disability denial has been appealed to federal court and then remanded
to the agency. 165 In these instances, the proceeding has become an
"adversary adjudication" for purposes of the EAJA.166
In 2002, the Supreme Court resolved the question of the possible
overlap of the EAJA and the Social Security Act's attorney fee
provisions. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart67 held that Congress had provided
162 See id § 2412(d) (2003).
163 Id. § 504(b)(1)(C) (2003).
164 490 U.S. 877 (1989).
165 See id. at 892, in which the Court stated the following:
We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits litigation
and retains continuing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from the Secretary
which will determine the claimant's entitlements to benefits, the proceedings on
remand are an integral part of the "civil action" for judicial review, and thus attorney's
fees for representation on remand are available subject to the other limitations in the
EAJA.
Id.
166 See id. Justice White, writing for four dissenters, criticized the majority for ignoring the
"plain language" of EAJA's definition of "adversary adjudication," which requires the presence
of government representation. Id, at 893. Subsequently, in Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89,
102 (1991), the Supreme Court clarified the timing of when EAJA fees may be sought following
Social Security disability proceedings. The Court said:
In sentence four [of 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5(g)] cases, the filing period begins after the final
judgment ("affirming, modifying, or reversing") is entered by the court and the appeal
period has run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable .... In sentence six cases,
the filing period does not begin until after the postremand proceedings are complete,
the Secretary returns to the court, the court enters a final judgment, and the appeal
period runs.
Id. See also Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (making clear that a Social Security claimant who
obtains a sentence-four judgment reversing the Secretary's denial of benefits meets the
description of a 'prevailing party,' given that not only do sentence-four renands terminate the
litigation with victory for the plaintiff, but a judgment authorized by sentence-four becomes a
"final judgment" when the time for appeal has expired); Arisitzabal v. Chater, 1998 WL 426634 *
1 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
167 535 U.S. 789 (2002).
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that EAJA fees for claimants prevailing in court supplement the fees
payable to attorneys out of the claimants past-due benefits under §
406(b) of the Social Security Act: "Fee awards may be made under both
prescriptions, but the claimant's attorney must 'refun[d] to the claimant
the amount of the smaller fee.""' 68
3. Would the Equal Access to Justice Act Apply to Social Security
Administration "Adversarial" Adjudications?
The question of whether the injection of government
representatives into SSA administrative hearings would, perforce, make
them all covered by EAJA was raised in the comments submitted to
SSA's original proposed rule setting up the SSARP. SSA responded:
There are several reasons why we do not believe the EAJ Act will
appreciably affect SSA proceedings under this project. First, it
remains to be determined whether the circumstances of the SSA
representative project render the adjudication adversarial for
purposes of the EAJ Act. Second, there is some question as to
whether the existing attorney fee provisions of the Social Security
Act preempt the provisions of the EAJ Act. 169 Finally, there will
presumably be few cases in which the position taken by the SSA
representative will not be "substantially justified," since the SSA
representative will have the authority to propose allowance of those
claims which present a clear case for entitlement or eligibility for
benefits. 170
After the end of the project, SSA addressed this issue again when it
issued rules implementing 1985 amendments to EAJA, Public Law No.
99-80, because some cases decided under the project that were still
pending could have been eligible for EAJA fees. 171 SSA explained that
although HHS has taken the position that proceedings in this project
were not within the scope of the EAJA as originally enacted, the
legislative history of the amendments indicated that the Act should
apply to cases in this project. Therefore "HHS has determined that the
EAJA should be applied to all cases in this project where the project
representative, at a hearing, represented an agency position opposing
entitlement to benefits.' 72
168 Id at 796 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985)).
169 Authors' note-this was resolved in 1985. See Gisbrecht v. Bamhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002).
170 Final Rule: Project To Improve the Hearing Process Through the Involvement of SSA
Representatives, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,117, 36,121 (Aug. 19, 1982).
171 Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Agency Proceedings, 52 Fed. Reg.
23,311 (June 19, 1987) (implementing Pub. L. No. 90-80 which became effective on Aug. 5,
1987).
172 Id. at 23,312 (citations omitted).
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Given this history and the recent caselaw extending EAJA
coverage to some non-APA administrative adjudications,17 3 it would be
difficult for SSA to argue that its ALJ hearings would not be covered by
EAJA if its representatives were to participate as advocates in the
hearings by "opposing entitlement to benefits."1 74
Under current law, with EAJA primarily covering only court
litigation against the SSA, the Supreme Court has ruled that fee awards
may be made under both statutes, but that claimant's attorneys must
refund to claimants the amount of the smaller fee. 175 Fees awarded
under EAJA are paid from the agency's budget, 176 unlike fees awarded
under the Social Security Act which are payable to attorneys out of the
claimants past-due benefits. This means that claimant's attorneys
would have the incentive to seek fees under both statutes so that their
client's benefits are reduced as little as possible. If EAJA coverage
were expanded to all SSA administrative adjudications by virtue of the
addition of government representatives, the potential budget
implications for SSA could be quite significant due to the high volume
of cases.
This is true notwithstanding the fact that EAJA awards in
individual SSA cases are relatively small when compared to such fees in
other court litigation against the government. In 1993, Harold Krent
analyzed data on SSA EAJA fee applications between June 1989 and
June 1990, drawn from SSA's own reports and data collected by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts ("AO"). 177 The AO's data on
385 EAJA applications in Social Security cases showed that 350 (91
percent) were granted (thus showing that the substantial justification
defense does not pose much of a hurdle). 178 For those 350 cases the
mean award was $3346.179 More complete data compiled by SSA
showed 2007 applications for EAJA fees resolved, with 1700 (85
percent) granted.1 80 Of the applications granted, the mean request was
$3584,181 and the mean award was $3244.182 These figures compared to
173 See, e.g., Lane v. USDA, 120 F.3d 106 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding adjudication conducted by
hearing officers in the USDA's National Appeals Division are "adversary adjudications" covered
by EAJA); Collard v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 154 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that although
statute governing extinguishing of mining patent did not expressly call for formal APA
adjudication, an APA hearing was constitutionally required; thus under Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), the hearing was governed by section 554 of the APA, thus making
plaintiffs eligible for EAJA reimbursement).
174 See supra text accompanying note 163-64.
175 See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002).
176 See 5 U.S.C. § 504(d) (2003).
177 See Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under The Equal Access To Justice Act-A Qualified
Success, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 458, 485-89 (1993).
178 See id. at 487.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 487-88.
181 See id. at 485.
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a mean of $48,000 in non-SSA court litigation and $10,305 for all (non-
SSA) agency adjudications during the same period. 83 Even so, with
over 250,000 SSA ALJ reversals of initial denials a year, if 200,000 of
these resulted in awards of $5000 (taking into account inflation since
1990), that could easily result in another $100 million drain on SSA's
budget (since EAJA fees must be paid from agency appropriations
according to 5 U.S.C. § 504(d)).
This potential drain on the public fisc, if broad EAJA coverage of
administrative hearings were to be triggered by casting the government
"representative" in an adversarial role, is a relevant, if not a
determinative, consideration in deciding how to best provide additional
governmental resources to the development of the record for decision.
IV. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S REPRESENTATION PROJECT
A. Background
The SSARP, begun in 1982, was described as follows:
SSA has decided to undertake a limited test using special SSA
representatives in connection with disability hearings in selected
hearing offices. We wish to determine whether the participation of
SSA representatives will sharpen factual issues, improve case record
development and contribute to improved quality, consistency and
timeliness of case dispositions at the hearing level.
When the case file is received at the hearing office, the SSA
representative will examine it to determine whether it is ready for a
hearing. If necessary the SSA representative will initiate further case
record development. After the case is fully prepared for a hearing it
will be assigned to an administrative law judge who will review the
record and conduct the hearing.
During the prehearing stage, the SSA representative may contact the
claimant's representative to clarify the issues in dispute. In addition,
the SSA representative may meet with witnesses who will appear at
the hearing. The SSA representative may recommend to the
administrative law judge that the issues in dispute, as agreed to by
the SSA representative and the claimant's representative, be
considered as the issues at the hearing. The SSA representative may
also petition the AU to include new issues, or to dismiss the case for
jurisdictional reasons or may ask that the administrative law judge
disqualify himself or herself when appropriate under the regulations.
On the other hand, where the evidence clearly establishes the
182 See Harold J. Krent, supra note 177, at 488.
183 See id. at 485, 489.
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claimant's entitlement, the SSA representative may recommend that
the administrative law judge issue a favorable decision without the
need for a hearing.
If the claimant is represented at the hearing, the SSA representative
will also appear at the hearing. The SSA representative will be able
to carry out all of the functions of a party to the hearing.... After the
hearing, the SSA representative will not participate in any
proceedings before the Appeals Council, although the Appeals
Council may exercise its authority to review any case on its own
motion. The SSA representative may be involved in cases which are
remanded by the Appeals Council if the SSA representative
participated in the prior proceedings which are the basis for the
Appeals Council remand order. 184
In the preamble to this final rule, the agency explained how the
final rules differed from the proposed rules. 185 It listed a number of
changes made after the comment periods. The SSA representative
would be directly employed by OHA and would participate in the
hearing whenever the claimant has an appointed representative at the
hearing, whether an attorney or a nonattorney. Her or his role would
not be limited to the issue of disability nor would s/he be prohibited
from meeting with the claimant's witnesses, subject to the consent of
the claimant and his or her representative. On the other hand, s/he
would not be permitted to refer cases to the Appeals Council for
possible own-motion review. All disability cases in the participating
hearing offices would be included.
The project commenced in October 1982 in five hearing offices
(Baltimore, MD; Brentwood, MO; Columbia, SC; Kingsport, TN; and
Pasadena, CA) with the expectation that it would last "at least" one
year.' 86 The Brentwood hearing office ceased to participate in October
1983. In 1984, the SSA issued a notice continuing the project for at
least another year. 8 7 It explained that the reason for the extension was
"[d]ue to the limited duration of the project to date, the normal start-up
problems in implementing such a change in the usual hearing process,
and the limited Appeals Council and court experience to date."' 88
184 Final Rule: Project To Improve the Hearing Process Through the Involvement of SSA
Representatives, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,118 (Aug. 19 1982). The regulations were initially proposed
on January 11, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg. 2345). That proposal was withdrawn, after public hearings, in
a notice published on July 14, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg. 47,162). On February 18, 1982, SSA published
a notice reinstating the proposed rules (47 Fed. Reg. 7261).
185 See id. at 36,118-36.
186 See id. at 36,118.
187 Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Federal Old
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind,
and Disabled; Project To Improve the Hearing Process Through the Involvement of SSA
Representatives, Notice of Continuance of the SSA Representation Project, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,872
(April 9,1984).
188 Id_
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In 1986, the SSA issued a notice of continuance and restructuring
of the SSA representation project under auspices of the adjudicatory
improvement project ("AIP"). 189 It stated that under the AIP:
[A]n agency-wide task force that will manage all aspects of the field
testing of the Social Security Administration (SSA) Representation
Project and conduct all data collection, evaluation, and planning
activities required to determine whether (1) permanent
implementation of SSA representation should be proposed; (2)
restructuring of the operational format of the SSA Representation
Project; and (3) evaluation of testing under this restructured format
after 1 year beginning April 30, 1986.190
The agency also concluded that for the next year, "testing [should]
be continued in a restructured format and evaluated under agency-wide
auspices." 191 It determined that the project should be restructured so
that: (1) the representatives were separated from participating ALJ
hearing offices; (2) when a request for hearing is filed, the SSA
component having the claim file(s) will forward it directly to the office
of the SSA representative; (3) the efficiency with which a single office
of representatives can service more than one ALJ hearing office is
tested; and (4) communication and feedback is improved by establishing
liaison functions between the offices of the SSA representatives and the
State agencies, district offices, hearing offices and SSA central office
components. In addition enhanced data and management, case
sampling, cost analysis, and opinion polls were suggested.' 92
Following the testing SSA pledged to evaluate the results to
determine whether SSA representation should be continued or
terminated. It also stated it would not expand the program without
going though rulemaking or propose legislative implementation without
consultation with Congress.
In July 1986, the federal district court issued an injunction against
continuation of the program in Sailing v. Bowen. 193 While an appeal
was pending with the Fourth Circuit, the SSA decided to end the
program and revoked the regulations "pertaining to all aspects of the
field testing of the [SSARP]."' 194 The appeal was never heard.
The agency gave a rather terse explanation for this decision:
After consideration of all the factors involved, we have decided
189 See Notice of Continuance and Restructuring or the SSA Representation Project under
Auspices of the Adjudicatory Improvement Project, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,156 (June 11, 1986).
190 Id.
191 Id
192 Id. at 21,157.
193 641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1986). The Sailing decision is discussed infra Parts IV.C. &
IV.D.
194 Final Rule, Discontinuance of the SSA Representation Project, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,285 (May
7, 1987).
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that the Project will not be resumed, regardless of the ultimate
disposition of the litigation. The decision to terminate is based on
managerial, administrative, and budgetary considerations, and was
made only after careful consideration of all factors, including the fact
that SSA had to stop the Project to comply with the district court's
injunctive order. Additionally, SSA had made commitments to
Congress that the Project and the agency's evaluation of government
representation in Social Security hearings would be concluded by
April 1987. Resumption of the Project so as to generate sufficient
information on which to evaluate government representation in
Social Security hearings prior to that date is not possible. With
increasing workloads before SSA, it was decided that the
administrative resources which would have had to have been
committed to the resumption of the Project and further testing of the
concept of government representation can best be utilized in other
ways....
The Department has since chosen to discontinue the Project,
regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit, is no longer holding
hearings under these regulations, and so informed the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where the district court's order was
on appeal. Repeal of these regulations is therefore merely a
formality and use of notice and public comment procedures is
unnecessary. 19
5
B. Social Security Administration's Interim Report on the Social
Security Administration Representation Project
In June 1986, SSA, under the auspices of the Adjudicatory
Improvement Project, prepared a report on the SSARP covering the
period from its inception on October 12, 1982 to September 30, 1985.196
It was called an interim report because a final report was to have been
issued after further testing, but with the termination of the project, no
such report was made.
Data was compiled on 15,552 SSARP case dispositions. In 60.7
percent of these cases, SSA representatives undertook prehearing case
development. By contrast, ALJs undertook this responsibility in only 2
percent of the cases, thus leading the study to conclude that there was "a
high degree of ALJ acceptance of SSA representative evidence
development."'197
More specifically, the study found that SSA representatives
primarily initiated case development from treating physicians-
195 Id. at 17,286.
196 See SSA Representation Project, SSA INTERIM REPORT (1986).
197 Id at 2.
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requesting information from such sources in 47 percent of all project
dispositions. This compares with requests for consultative examinations
in 11.5 percent of the cases. Other existing medical evidence was
sought in 22 percent of the cases. 98 To some extent this emphasis was
affected by the development practices of the various state DDSs-
which requested consultative examinations in over 50 percent of the
cases and had widely different rates of providing additional medical
evidence. 199
In addition, SSA representatives recommended dismissals in 2.8
percent of the cases (which were accepted by the ALJs 74.3 percent of
the time). They also recommended "fully favorable" decisions in 7
percent of the cases (which were approved by ALJs in 90.7 percent of
the time). This represented 17.5 percent of all fully favorable decisions.
These "favorables" were recommended at the same rate for represented
and unrepresented claimants. 200
SSA representatives also made recommendations to the ALJs for
calling expert medical or vocational witnesses. They did so in 18.9
percent of the cases involving unrepresented claimants and in 28.6
percent of the cases involving represented claimants. The great
majority of these experts were vocational experts.20 1
Once the case made it to the hearing stage, SSA representatives
participated only when the claimant was represented. This was the case
in 66.3 percent of the project dispositions, and in 72.1 percent of
hearings held in project cases (a total of 8,519 hearings). In such
hearings, SSA representatives submitted additional evidence in 2.6
percent of these hearings, while claimant representatives did so in 80
percent of the hearings. Postponements or continuances were requested
in 22 percent of these cases, but 85.2 percent of these requests were
filed by claimant's counsel, compared to 2.3 percent by the SSA
representative. 20 2 As for hearing length, those involving unrepresented
claimants averaged thirty-nine minutes, while those involving
represented claimants (and SSA representatives) averaged fifty-three
minutes. 203
The overall hearing stage processing time for project cases
(including cases decided without an oral hearing) averaged 178 days
and was further broken down by stages: (1) the time from the request
for hearing to the receipt of the case in the Social Security
Representation Office averaged 49 days; (2) from receipt to assignment
198 See id. at 3.
199 See id. at 4.
200 See id. at 5.
201 See SSA Representation Project, supra note 196, at 6.
202 See id. at 7.
203 See id
[Vol. 25:1
2003] SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY HEARINGS 47
to the ALJ averaged twelve days; (3) from assignment to the hearing
date averaged fifty-nine days; and (4) from the hearing to date of
disposition averaged sixty-eight days. Only the time spent in the second
stage (twelve days) was solely attributed to actions by the SSA
representatives. 204
With respect to post hearing development, claimants'
representatives requested additional record development after the
hearing in 16.6 percent of the represented dispositions, compared to
requests by SSA representatives in 5.6 percent of those dispositions.20 5
Represented claimants achieved a fully or partially favorable decision in
57.6 percent of the decisions (or in 51.9 percent of the cases when
dismissals are included); while unrepresented claimants did not fare as
well-49 percent fully or partially favorable decisions (38.5 percent
when dismissals are included).20 6 Since unrepresented claimants were
not opposed by SSA representatives once the case is assigned for
hearing, this result is significant for the claimant's ability to recover.20 7
At the Appeals Council ("AC") stage, data for 1983 and 1984
showed that claimants had requested AC review in 72.3 percent of the
unfavorable ALJ decisions, but that such review was granted in only 6.7
percent of the cases. 208 Under the Project, SSA representatives could
also refer a case for possible "own motion" review by the AC. They did
this in 10.2 percent of the favorable decisions.2 09 Almost half of these
requests (47.8 percent) were granted. 210
With respect to judicial review in the federal district court, 27
percent of final unfavorable SSA determinations in project cases (AC
request of a denial of review, affirmation of an ALJ unfavorable
decision, or reversal of an ALJ favorable decision) were appealed in
1983 through September 1984. This was 16 percent lower than the
national appeal rate of about 32 percent. 211
Judging from the figures contained in this report, the SSARP did
have some success in freeing the ALJs from having to undertake case
development (in all but 2 percent of the cases), but it is harder to
identify any overall case processing efficiencies. Also, although SSA
representatives only rarely took the initiative to recommend fully
favorable decisions before a hearing, on the other hand, neither did they
take a particularly aggressive approach to preparing for the hearing. For
204 See id. at 9.
205 See id. at 7.
206 See SSA Representation Project, supra note 196, at 8.
207 See id. It should be noted that unrepresented claimants may have weaker cases to present
since claimants' attorneys presumably screen cases to decide whether they are worth taking.
208 See id. at 10.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 Seeid. at ll.
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example, they initiated case development primarily from treating
physicians rather than from consultant physicians. They also submitted
additional evidence at the hearings and sought continuances much less
frequently than claimant's counsel. While hearings with both claimant
and SSA representatives took longer than hearings involving
unrepresented claimants (where no SSA representative was present),
represented claimants still fared significantly better than unrepresented
claimants notwithstanding the presence of SSA representatives. Finally,
although SSA representatives did have significant influence in initiating
Appeals Counsel review, the percentage of appeals to the courts by
losing claimants in SSARP cases was significantly lower than usual. In
sum, while the SSA's own report shows a mixed picture, the statistics
disclosed above do not indicate that the government representatives
overreached by opposing claimants' counsel in an unduly adversarial
way.
C. The District Court Injunction in Salling v. Bowen 212
In November 1982, just one month into the experiment, the
SSARP was challenged by seven applicants for Social Security benefits
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief In 1986, in an opinion by
Judge Glen M. Williams, the district court in the Western District of
Virginia granted the relief and this decision ultimately led to the ending
of the project.213
One of the court's main concerns was ALJ independence. Judge
Williams was concerned about the SSARP's provision for extensive
case development by the SSA representative ("SSAR") and late
involvement by the ALJ:
Instead of going to the OHA in Kingsport, the claim file goes
directly to the SSARP office and remains under its control until such
time as the case is ready for hearing. Only then will the ALJ see the
file and have anything to do with the case. The SSARP offices do all
the prehearing screening, case docketing, control, selection of
documents to be included in the hearing exhibit, preparation of the
exhibit list, preparation and release of development requests, contact
with the attorney if there is one, and contact with the claimant where
there is no attorney and direct intervention on the part of an SSAR
where the person is not represented, by communication with the
claimant. Indeed, the ALJ who will eventually try the case will not
know that he is assigned to the case until the case has been received
in the OHA for hearing.... This again acts as a halter on the
212 641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1986).
213 See id.
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independence of the ALJs in the handling of cases, and places the
file not in the hand of an independent person but in the hands of an
advocate of the government. 2 14
More critically, Judge Williams also found that the project
increased delays in case handling:
In some instances, the time for hearing a case is three times as long;
there is a longer delay between the request for a hearing and the
hearing: the number of cases disposed of by the ALJs has decreased;
more cases are being referred to the Appeals Council for own-motion
reviews by the SSARs, many of which should not have been sent to
the Appeals Council for own-motion review: which cumulatively has
resulted in great harm to claimants by causing delay in their receipt
of benefits.
2 15
The court also determined that there were fewer decisions
favorable to the claimants in the participating OHA offices, that
uniformity in decisionmaking in those offices did not improve, that in at
least one case the SSAR failed in his duty to develop the evidence, and
that the SSARs improperly referred favorable decisions to the Appeals
Council for review.216
Finally, the court noted a report on the use of SSARs to present
oral argument in twenty-five Social Security appeal cases before a
United States Magistrate, stating that "[t]he court appearances by the
SSARs is completely outside the scope of the Secretary's regulations
for the SSARP and are in violation of the provision that SSARs will not
participate in claims beyond the ALJ hearing stage. '2 17 The court then
held that the procedures used in the SSARP were not "fundamentally
fair" 2 18 as required by Richardson v. Perales,219 and violated the three-
214 Id. at 1060.
215 Id. at 1060-61.
216 See id. at 1062-63 (citing Judge Williams' own decision in Darnell v. Bowen, 631 F. Supp
96 (W.D. Va. 1986)).
217 Sailing v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1067 (W.D. Va. 1986). Judge Williams's distrust of
SSA's motives in regard to its ALJs is apparent in the following scathing passage:
This court finds that both the SSARP and the AIP are simply nothing more nor less
than an attempt by the bureaucracy to control the independence of the ALJs. Their
mission is to employ people who will have control of the files before they go to the
AL. This program began in an announced purpose of having the representatives
develop the case and permit the judge to sit and objectively hear and, if necessary,
further develop and decide the case. By giving the file to the SSAR instead of to the
ALJ it permits the government a second chance to defeat the claim by new medical
evidence without the claimant knowing anything about it. It affords the opportunity for
the SSARs to go fishing for additional evidence to support the government's position.
In essence, there are persons in the administration who do not trust judges and in
particular, do not trust ALJs and who want to destroy their independence, and have
used the SSARP and AIP process to aid in their efforts.
Id.
218 Id. at 1068.
219 402 U.S. 389,401 (1971).
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pronged test for due process as propounded by Mathews v. Eldridge.220
D. Evaluation of the Sailing Decision
The government prepared an appeal of Salling v. Bowen221 but
decided not to pursue it. So the decision stands unreviewed. However,
despite the court's exhaustive review of the program and the context in
which it was operating, some of its assumptions should not go
unchallenged. One fallacy is the assumption that the favorable cases
decided prior to the institution of the SSARP were all correctly decided.
For example, the court stated:
The statistics show that in the five OHAs originally involved in the
experiment prior to the adversarial proceeding beginning, about five
out of ten claimants had strong enough cases to justify the granting
of benefits, however, since the SSARs entered the picture, they have
recommended that only one out of ten claimants has a strong enough
case. Thus, the SSARs are opposing ninety percent of all the
claimants with strong enough cases to win.222
The court also suggested that the SSARs were improperly referring
cases to the Appeals Council for review:
The SSARs, using their authority to refer cases to the Appeals
Council have adopted an adversary appellate process as shown by
the undisputed evidence in this case. They, therefore, refer decisions
favorable to the claimant 20 percent of the time according to the
statistics which have been presented .... Without the SSARs, it is
probable that none of these cases would have been before the
Appeals Council for its own-motion review. 223
220 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The test requires the following:
[C]onsideration of three distinct factors: [fQirst, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interests, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 334-35. The Mathews test, of course, only comes into play where there is a threatened
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Judge Williams finds it "obvious that, in a Social Security
context, a person has a property interest to protect." This is certainly true where the government
is seeking to take away existing benefits, but is somewhat less obvious where the government is
denying an initial claim for benefits. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40
(1999) (claimants did not have property interest in having insurers pay for medical treatments
prior to determination that treatments were reasonable and necessary); Dusenbery v. United
States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (referring to the Mathews balancing test as "first conceived in
the context of a due process challenge to the adequacy of administrative procedures used to
terminate Social Security disability benefits") (emphasis added).
221 641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1986).
222 Id. at 1069.
223 Id
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These observations seem to assume that the SSAR's role was to be
the claimant's advocate. However, given that claimants have their own
representatives, the SSAR's role was to provide objective advice to the
ALJ and to the Appeals Counsel about the need for review. It is hardly
surprising that the SSARs did not recommend grants of benefits before
hearing at the same rate that benefits were previously granted by the
ALJs. Nor should it be surprising that the SSARs recommended
Appeals Council review of 20 percent of the cases granted by ALJs.
Judge Williams did not find an overall reduction in benefits; what he
did find was an improper delay in payments. 224 Delay is a concern, of
course, but whether it rises to the level of a due process violation that
justifies permanent termination of any type of government
representation is a doubtful proposition. 22
The court's decision is clearly animated by concern over ALJ
independence within the SSA. Judge Williams concluded as follows:
[A]dministrative procedures used in making Social Security
disability determinations are a cumbersome 'Rube Goldberg' process
at best, which have been further encumbered by a threat to the
independence of the ALJs who are the only people in the entire
system who are oriented toward the main goal which should be the
seeking of truth and ultimate triumph of justice.226
This concern was understandable given what became SSA's illegal
actions against its ALJs in the 1980's.227 But those actions have been
roundly criticized and the agency is unlikely to repeat them. Moreover,
many in the ALJ community now favor government representation in
SSA disability cases. 228
224 In its brief to the Fourth Circuit, the government, in addition to questioning the judge's
statistical analysis, argued that the district court's finding that there had been no drastic reduction
in favorable decisions in the Kingsport office was a "telling indicator of the fairness of the
project." See Reply Brief for Appellant, at 4, Sailing v. Bowen, No. 86-2121 (4th Cir. 1986)
(appeal withdrawn).
225 It should be noted that the permanent injunction issued by Judge Williams in this case only
extends to "any further proceedings using the SSARP or the ALP in any of the remaining five
participating OHAs throughout the United States." Salling, 641 F. Supp. at 1074. In its brief to
the Fourth Circuit, the government argued that since no class was certified in this case, the judge
erred in granting relief beyond the one OHA office over which it had jurisdiction. See Reply
Brief for Appellant, at 2, 16-18, Salling, No. 86-2121.
226 Sailing, 641 F. Supp. at 1073.
227 See Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C 1984).
228 In testimony to the House Social Security Subcommittee, the President of the Association
of Administrative Law Judges stated:
The past pilot program of the govcrnment representation project was not an adequate
test of this system. The SSA should implement a new test program for agency
representation at the hearing. This pilot project should be implemented in coordination
with the claimants' bar, SSA employee organizations, our Association, and other
interested groups. The pilot program should address the issues raised by the court in
Sailing. The objective is to establish a hearing process that provides a full and fair
hearing for all parties who have an interest in the case.
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Our conclusion is that while the Sailing decision did illuminate
some significant problems with the SSARP, it went too far (even in its
own terms and time) by holding the use of government counsel to be a
violation of due process. As a result, Salling should not necessarily
constrain a renewed experiment concerning the use of government
"advocates," if SSA wishes to attempt one. Of course, any such
experiment should draw lessons from the SSARP and avoid some of its
pitfalls. For example, such an experiment should not be limited to five
locations. Nor should it simply involve inserting SSA attorneys into the
process as advocates without adequate orientation and training, and
without adjusting other aspects of the process to take account of this
change. Also, the use of such attorneys to present oral argument in
federal district court against the claimant's award should be avoided as
well, since that is clearly an adversary role.
However, if the goals of the SSARP can be met with an alternative,
non-adversary approach that involves both procedural changes and
changes in the deployment of personnel, most of the objections raised in
Salling fall away. As discussed later,229 nonadversary representatives
would be trained and directed to work together with, and not in
opposition to, claimants and their representatives. Moreover, our
nonadversary representative model could be (and should be) used in all
cases, including those cases where the claimant is unrepresented. In
fact, since building a complete record is one of its main purposes,
introducing a nonadversarial representative into the process could be
most beneficial when a claimant is unrepresented. Finally, the
suggested reform, unlike a re-tooled SSARP, has two crucial benefits to
SSA: it can be implemented directly, without the need for
experimentation or legislation, and it avoids the costs associated with
the applicability of the EAJA to SSA hearings.230
In addition, in the current non-adversarial setting, the SSA ALJ has the legal
responsibility to "wear three hats" in each case. The ALJ legally is bound to ensure
that all of the claimant's relevant and material evidence is made part of the record and
the claimant's interests are protected, to protect the interests of the government in the
hearing, and to make a fair decision which is based on the evidence in the record.
Additionally, the judge must take care to not become overly protective of the interest
of the government for fear that the case will be reversed on appeal on a claim of bias
against the claimant. The inherent conflict in all of these roles is patent and would be
resolved by having the govemment rcprcsented at the hearing.
Hearing Series on Social Security Disability Programs' Challenges and Opportunities: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of the Hon. Ronald G. Bernoski, Administrative Law Judge,
Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and
President, Association of Administrative Law Judges, Milwaukee, Wisconsin). At least some
ALJs and many SSA Regional Counsels view this question differently. See infra Part V.
229 See infra Part V.A.
230 See supra Part III.C.3.
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V. ISOLATING THE PROBLEM: INCOMPLETE AND EVER-CHANGING
RECORD FOR DECISION
Based on our review of the current process, we believe that one
fundamental problem has led the SSAB and others to raise questions
concerning government representation and closing the record: disability
decisions, including, but not limited to, those made by ALJs following
an administrative hearing, are made on the basis of incomplete and
ever-changing evidentiary records. In this part we analyze this issue
based upon our own and other informed commentary. In the final part,
we propose recommendations to remedy this central problem.
It is apparent from the remarks of representatives of two key
groups present at the June 2002 House Subcommittee hearings-
claimant advocates on the one hand and SSA and OHA personnel,
including ALJs, on the other-that most claimant advocates oppose
government representation and closing the record while some SSA
officials, and some ALJs in particular, favor both initiatives.231
However, when questioned more specifically on these issues during
interviews with the authors, representatives of these same two groups of
interested parties (a number of whom also testified earlier at the
Subcommittee hearing) presented more qualified views. 232
To be sure, the advocacy group representatives were uniformly
opposed to government representation, seeing such an effort as
inevitably becoming adversarial and citing the problems with the 1980's
experiment. Although most of the ALJs interviewed favored the
concept of government representation, other SSA personnel expressed
doubts about SSA adopting an adversarial position on claims before a
full record had been developed and a decision reached at the
administrative hearing. Moreover, many SSA personnel pointed out the
high cost of implementing a full-blown government representative
program, both financially and politically. However, when asked to
consider the question functionally-what would someone in the role of
government representative (or some other, similar role) add to the
process?-virtually all of the persons interviewed pointed to the need
for better development of the evidentiary record. They also agreed on
what "better" means in this context: obtaining all relevant medical and
vocational information from the appropriate sources, and doing so as
soon in the process as possible. When asked what sort of a person is
needed to fill that role, there were various suggestions, but an advocate
231 These remarks are summarized in Appendix III to our formal report to the SSAB, available
at http://www.ssab.goviblochlubbersverkuil.pdf. See supra note *.
232 Summaries of these interviews can be found at Appendix I to our formal report to the
SSAB. Id.
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for the government's position was far down on the list.
As for closing the record, the difference in views among the people
interviewed depended to a large extent on their confidence in the record
development process. A minority of the ALJs interviewed suggested
that even under current circumstances the record could be closed at the
DDS level (after reconsideration), so that ALJs could act more like
appellate judges. This is also the position of the National Association of
Disability Examiners ("NADE"), which has urged that the process be
changed so that claimants receive a medical hearing at the DDS level
followed by a "legal review to ensure that the medical decision correctly
followed the laws. '233 Everyone else agreed that the time to close the
record was ordinarily after the administrative hearing was over and
before the AU makes a decision. Those who were the most confident
about the record development process were more likely to suggest a
"bright line" cut-off. Those more concerned about the quality of the
record, even after the hearing has been held, were more likely to suggest
some sort of safety valve, such as a "good cause" requirement for
submitting additional evidence along the lines of the requirement for
submitting additional evidence at the district court. 234
The persons interviewed disagreed as to whether the current
attorney's fee structure acts as a disincentive for claimant lawyers to
submit all evidence in a timely manner.2 35 Claimant lawyers insist that
they develop their cases as quickly as they can, and point to
administrative problems (such as late availability of claim files and last-
minute scheduling of hearings) as contributing to any delay. But some
ALJs go so far as to suggest that claimant lawyers withhold evidence at
the AU hearing and wait to submit it to the Appeals Council in order to
increase past-due benefits and, as a result, their fees. There is no more
than anecdotal evidence that claimant lawyers delay the process
deliberately, and the authors have concluded that this practice is not a
systemic problem.236 Nonetheless, a virtue of establishing a reasonable
233 Hearing Series on Social Security Disability Programs' Challenges and Opportunities:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Jeffrey H. Price President, National Association of
Disability Examiners, Raleigh, North Carolina).
234 See LEWIN REPORT, supra note 8, at 169, stating the following:
Although [the] argument for closing the record has merit, given the length of the initial
determination and appeals process, it seems very inequitable to only let applicants who
have new evidence use it if they return to the beginning and start again. If the process
were much faster, the inequity of a closed process would not be such an issue. SSA
could also consider a limited open record policy, in which new evidence is only
accepted if it meets standards that have been designed to encourage submission of
evidence earlier in the process.
Id.
235 Since fee awards are limited to a percentage of back pay recoveries, the longer the process
takes the greater the amount of fees that can be earned. See supra Part III.C. 1.
236 See id. at 23 (reporting that some judges and others had made allegations to this effect).
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rule for closing the record at the ALJ hearing level is that it would help
to reduce the potential for "gaming" the system.
If the key problem is an often-incomplete record, the question
becomes how to overcome that problem. The goal should be to get to
the point with record development where closing the record becomes a
non-controversial matter. Closing the record after the ALJ hearing is
controversial mainly because the current system for developing the
record up to that point does not do the job. Whether introducing a
government representative should be part of the record closing solution
also depends on how such a position might be structured.
A. Factors Related to Government Representation
One of the most consistently stated arguments in favor of
introducing a government representative is that the process has become
"too one-sided" in favor of claimants.237  The most important
consequence, the argument goes, is that the record becomes imbalanced;
claimants have their representatives, who look out for their interests and
fill the record with information favorable to their claims, while SSA sits
passively by and accepts the results. SSA has no direct voice at the
hearing, and to the extent that its interests are looked after by the ALJs,
their ability to do that effectively is hindered by their three-hat role
which restrains them from acting on behalf of the government. 238
Claimant representatives do not dispute the first part of this
characterization-that they look out for their client's interests and seek
evidence to support their claims-but see it instead as an indication that
they are doing their job well. 239  Claimant representatives also
acknowledge the lack of corresponding development by SSA in many
cases, but they see this more as an extension of the poor development
practices at the DDS level than as a matter of competitive advantage.
But regardless of how it is characterized, the result is that ALJs must
237 See, e.g., Statement of the Hon. Hal Daub Chairman, supra note 23.
238 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (defining the "three hat" role).
Indeed, some ALJs interviewed expressed the view that the "three hat" role has become
increasingly unbalanced by the presence of claimant representatives. In this view, the presence of
a government representative "rebalances" the decision system and allows the ALJ to use the most
important of his or her three hats-impartial decider. See also LEWIN REPORT, supra note 8, at
23 (suggesting that under an adversary system, "[t]he adjudicator's role is limited to conducting a
fair process and judging the relative merits of the arguments. The adjudicator is not distracted by
irrelevant information and need not have extensive programmatic expertise; the adjudicator
specializes in judging.").
239 Indeed, many observers have noted that the most important "lawyering" in a disability
benefits case is developing the evidentiary record. See, e.g., William B. Popkin, The Effect of
Representation in Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62
CORNELL L. RaV. 989 (1977).
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either take up the slack themselves or decide the claim on less than a
full and complete record. Some ALJs assume this record-development
responsibility regularly and without objection, as many courts have
indicated they must,240 but this does not seem to be the optimal solution.
With one hat gone (representation of the claimant), the ALJ is
constrained from wearing the second (representing the government) for
fear of transforming the third hat (objective decider) into a cocked hat.
The objectivity of ALJs is always subject to challenge. 241 It is too
important an asset to be jeopardized and the entire system benefits from
reinforcing it.
Assuming that the "imbalance" problem should not be handed off
to the ALJs, the question becomes: what should be done about it-and
by whom? It is not at all clear that inserting an adversarial SSA
counterpart to the claimant representative is the best answer. SSA and
claimants are in different positions and have different roles in the
disability adjudication process. SSA is not just the agency for
adjudicating Social Security benefits; while the claim is pending in the
administrative process, it is also Congress' partner in carrying out the
social goals of the Social Security Act.242 As such, the SSA does not
need a lawyer to represent it in the traditional (i.e., adversary) sense.
Disability decision making is simply not the product of an adversary
process. Even claimant representatives, most of whom are lawyers, are
subject to special rules governing representation that take into account
the unique aspects of public benefits practice. 243  The roles of a
claimant's representative as well as of any SSA representative are both
affected by the special nature of the Social Security application and
appeals process. This leads us to conclude that Congress was correct
when it originally cast the roles of SSA and claimant representatives as
complementary and largely cooperative. 244  SSA needs better
240 See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 410; Henrie v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 13
F.3d 359, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1993) ("ALJ has a basic obligation in every social security case to
ensure that an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the
issues.").
241 To the extent that district courts view the SSA disability system with a jaundiced eye, they
do so because of apparent qualms about the overall objectivity of the SSA decision system,
despite the presence of ALJs. See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review
Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 707 (2002) (comparing high reversal rates in SSA
cases despite use of "substantial evidence" test with low reversal rate in Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") cases despite use of de novo standard of review).
242 Once a claim moves on to judicial review in the federal courts, SSA is in a more traditional
adversary position vis-A-vis a claimant appealing a final agency decision denying benefits.
Indeed, at that point SSA is represented by the local US Attorney and the proceedings are
essentially adversarial.
243 The rules "set forth certain affirmative duties and prohibited actions which shall govern the
relationship between the representative and the Agency, including matters involving [SSA's]
administrative procedures and fee collections." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1740, 416.1540 (2003).
244 See generally Ronald S. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
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representation, but that representation need not be adversarial in the
traditional sense in order to effectuate the goals of the system. 245 In our
view, non-adversarial adjudication need not be an oxymoron.
Moreover, inserting an adversary SSA representative-whether a
lawyer or nonlawyer-into disability adjudications would not address
directly the most pressing functional needs of the process. The main
deficiency of the disability adjudication process is the lack of full and
timely development of the evidentiary record. Although the traditional
adversary system may ultimately produce a supportable version of the
"truth" at trial (or for pre-trial settlement), producing a full evidentiary
record is not the system's most important value.246 By contrast, most of
the all-important record development work on a Social Security
disability claim--obtaining existing medical and vocational records,
measuring existing information against alleged impairments and
applicable eligibility criteria, ordering additional medical and/or
vocational evaluations-are essentially bureaucratic neutral tasks that
may not benefit from the contested nature of the adversarial setting.
Potentially, both claimant and SSA interests could be served better by
introducing a nonadversarial governmental representative charged with
the responsibility to assure the development of a timely, full, and fair
record which would facilitate an objective decision by the ALJ.247 As
explained more fully below, we have chosen to call this representative a
"counselor."
A substantial number of proposals have been advanced that aim
directly at the record development problem in the disability adjudication
process. 248  Some focus on existing administrative practices and
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994); Rachel
Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation?
Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (1997) (urging non-zero sum outcomes). See
also ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY (2000) (contending that
society progresses to the extent it acts cooperatively).
245 See generally Frank S. Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-Adversarial Hearings:
The Need for Non-Adversary Representatives at Social Security Hearings, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 349
(1981). Of course, it is one thing to declare a representative "nonadversarial" and another to have
him or her perform that way. To the extent these representatives are attorneys, they may have a
professional inclination to be adversarial. On the other hand, a statutory mission that eschews
adversariness and a regulatory culture that ensures nonadversariness presents an opportunity to
carve out a category of representatives that are truly helpful and impartial.
246 The adversary system often creates records that obfuscate as well as illuminate, as the
discovery process in civil litigation shows. This is one reason why its role is best realized in
private litigation, not in the government benefits context. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Adversary
System, Liberalism and Beyond, 60 SOUNDINGS 54 (1977) (distinguishing private from public
litigation on this basis).
247 This point is developed in Bloch, supra note 245, at 400-01. Cf JERRY L. MASHAW, ET
AL., supra note 27, at 97-98 (discussing the need for government representation at ALJ hearings
and concluding: "If there is a respect in which a more adversary perspective may be required, it is
in the prehearing development of the facts, not the questioning of the witnesses at the hearing.").
248 See, e.g-, ACUS Recommendations 78-2 and 90-4, discussed supra Part I.B.
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procedures while others suggest deployment or redeployment of
personnel-all with the idea of improving SSA's performance relative
to developing the record for decision. One of these in particular-the
SSA's own Senior Attorney Project, which received support even from
groups generally opposed to a resurrection of the government
representation experiment-also lends support to our SSA Counselor
recommendations, and is consistent with the concept of non-adversarial
representation.
A number of the important proposals in this area were made earlier
by ACUS. 249 For example, ACUS urged SSA to require that the DDSs
communicate clearly and fully the rationale of their disability decisions
and the evidence on which they are based. ACUS also recommended
expanded use of prehearing conferences to frame the issues involved in
the ALJ hearing, identify matters not in dispute, determine whether
subpoenas might be necessary, consider witnesses that might need to be
called, and also decide appropriate cases favorable without hearings. 25 0
The SSA Counselor could orchestrate all of these functions in advance
of the ALJ hearing with the cooperation of the DDS and with the
participation of the ALJ, as appropriate. Other ACUS recommendations
urged SSA to develop specific guidelines for transmitting key medical
information, such as the data necessary to assess residual functional
capacity, and to provide adequate funding to pay for requested medical




Finally, we note that even though the Salling case went too far, the
results of the 1980's experiment were mixed, at best, and that has left a
negative perception. Were SSA to introduce a government advocate
into the process, it would first have to undertake another carefully
designed experiment with due regard to the lessons learned in the first
attempt. This would be a difficult task (but not an insurmountable one);
nevertheless, the inevitable challenges by disappointed claimants who
find themselves participants in the experiment (or affected by it) might
stymie and even derail it.
Given the potential downsides of experimenting with the adversary
process in this setting and our judgment that such a step would fail to
advance the crucial need to improve the record development process,
we conclude that the best SSA "representative" would be non-
adversarial-a person who could help provide the ALJ with a timely
249 For an overview of the proposals in this area, see supra Part I.B.
250 See Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary Recommendation,
55 Fed. Reg. 34, 213, 2-3 (Aug. 22, 1990).
251 See Improved Use of Medical Personnel in Social Security Disability Determinations,
5(c), available at www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/3058910.html, discussed in 55 Fed. Reg.
34,212, 5 (Aug. 22, 1990).
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and complete record for decision while not triggering a host of collateral
issues. 2
52
B. Factors Related to Closing the Record
Once steps like those discussed above are taken to allow the ALJ
to decide cases based on a full and complete record, then there should
be no hardship in closing the record after the hearing (or at a later
designated time set by the ALJ). Claimants' representatives can play
their part along with the Counselor to produce everything that is needed
for decision in a timely fashion. Any perverse incentives to withhold
evidence so as to lengthen the case and increase the amount of fees
would also be reduced. Still, we recognize that occasionally key
information-key to both SSA and the claimant in their shared desire to
produce a correct decision-cannot always be obtained in time. In such
situations, a "good cause" exception for reopening the record before the
ALJ should be available as a safety valve.253
VI. SOLVING THE PROBLEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The key problem with the current disability adjudication process is
the prevalence of incomplete and ever-changing evidentiary records.
Therefore, our recommendations are aimed directly at improving the
record for disability decisions. Because our study began with the goal
of examining the options of introducing some form of government
representative and closing the record at a pre-ordained time,254 our
recommendations address those options directly along with other issues
raised by our research. We have chosen not to propose a revival of the
experimental program involving a government representative as an
advocate. Instead our recommendations related to government
representation introduce a somewhat different concept: a "Counselor"
charged with the responsibility to take the lead in developing as
complete a record as possible for decision by the administrative law
252 Of course, merely labeling a representative nonadversarial does not make him or her so.
The rules of engagement must make the role clear and limited.
253 This is the standard used in the district courts for ordering a remand. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (2003). See also supra text accompanying note 145. One difficulty with proposing
changes in the rules for closing the record after the ALI hearing is that any such changes depend
on the status and purpose of the Appeals Council. What is clear is that the current rule of
allowing the submission of any "new and material" evidence to the Appeal Council, coupled with
often-deficient record development before and at the ALJ hearing, results in many time-
consuming remands back to the ALJ with little use of Council expertise.
254 As noted earlier, this article is based on a report the authors submitted to the SSAB; as part
of its charge, the SSAB asked that these questions be addressed. See supra note *.
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A. Overview of Recommendations
Our key recommendation is that SSA concentrate its efforts on
improving the record for decision at AU hearings. We believe that the
best way to achieve this goal is by introducing a nonadversary
Counselor into the disability adjudication process whose central role
would be to monitor the process of developing the evidentiary record
and to work closely with all of the key actors-the claimant (and the
claimant's representative, if there is one), the AU, and SSA (most
likely, through DDS)-in order to identify any gaps in the record and to
fill them as quickly and efficiently as possible. These Counselors
would remove much of the development work from the AU, including
assuring that the claimant's and SSA's (or DDS's) positions are fully
supported, and would serve a much-needed administrative liaison
function between the DDS and OHA.
We also recommend that the Counselors be given the resources
and authority necessary to move claims quickly, especially those where
benefits can be granted without a full administrative hearing. 255
Consistent with the concept of nonadversarial representation, we believe
that SSA Counselors need not be lawyers. Candidates for these
positions can be drawn from staff working already in the disability
determination process (at SSA, DDS, OHA, or the Appeals Council) or
from the outside. Most importantly, they must be qualified and trained
to assure that they understand not only the relevant medical, vocational,
and legal issues involved in Social Security disability adjudications, but
also to appreciate their unique role in the disability determination
process.
B. Recommendations Relating to Development of a Complete Record
for Decision by the Administrative Law Judge
1. SSA should concentrate its efforts in the disability adjudication
process on improving the record for decisions.
2. SSA should consider implementing administrative and
personnel reforms aimed at identifying and obtaining key
information as quickly as possible, such as:
255 We would anticipate that counselors would approach the ALJs with requests that a
claimant be paid without the need for a hearing where the evidence is clearly in support of the
claim.
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a. Requiring that the DDSs communicate clearly and fully the
rationale of their disability decisions and the evidence on
which they are based.
b. Developing specific guidelines for transmitting key medical
information, such as the data necessary to assess residual
functional capacity.
c. Providing adequate funding to pay for requested medical
records, including but not limited to those from claimants'
treating sources.
d. Encouraging ALJs to use their subpoena power when
needed to obtain relevant information, and providing the
DDSs with comparable mechanisms for enforcing similar
requests.
e. Requiring DDSs and OHA to make the existing record for
appealed claims available to claimants and their
representatives as quickly as possible, and requiring OHA to
set the date for ALJ hearings at least two months in advance.
3. SSA should consider creating a new administrative position,
called a "Counselor," with the express mandate of overseeing
and facilitating the development of the evidentiary record for
decision.2 56 As part of this process, the Counselor position
should have the following characteristics and responsibilities:
a. It should be charged with developing a full and complete
record as quickly as possible, in cooperation with claimants
(and their representatives), DDS, OHA, and other SSA
personnel.
b. It should have direct access to key DDS personnel in order
to question and clarify the DDS's rationale for its disability
decisions.
c. It should have independent authority to obtain information
256 Commissioner Barnhart has recently proposed the creation of a "Reviewing Official"
("RO") position which builds upon the Counselor position the authors recommend here, albeit
with some differences (e.g., the RO would have to be an attorney). She describes the RO position
as follows:
A Reviewing Official (RO) position would be created to evaluate claims at the next
stage of the process. If a claimant files a request for review of the DDS determination,
the claim would be reviewed by an SSA Reviewing Official. The RO, who would be
an attorney, would be authorized to issue an allowance decision or to concur in the
DDS denial of the claim. If the claim is not allowed by the RO, the RD will prepare
either a Recommended Disallowance or a Pre-Hearing Report. A Recommended
Disallowance would be prepared if the RO believes that evidence in the record shows
that the claimant is ineligible for benefits. It would set forth in detail the reasons the
claim should be denied. A Pre-Hearing Report would be prepared if the RO believes
the evidence in the record is insufficient to show that the claimant is eligible for
benefits but also fails to show that the claimant is ineligible for benefits. The report
would outline the evidence needed to fully support the claim.
Bamhart Statement, supra note 5.
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
for the record, including access to any available funds and
enforcement mechanisms.
d. It should have a formal role, either independently or in
cooperation with ALJs and other OHA staff, to narrow and
resolve particular issues and, when appropriate, to
recommend to an AU a fully favorable, on-the-record
decision.
e. It should be designated nonadversarial, even if attorneys fill
some of the positions.
C. Recommendations Related to Closing the Record
In connection with taking the steps called for in Part A of these
Recommendations, SSA should revise its regulations to close the
evidentiary record after the AU hearing, 57 subject to the following
qualifications:
1. ALJs may extend the time to submit evidence and/or written
argument for a reasonable period after the hearing and before
deciding the claim.
2. Claimants may request that the record before the ALJ be
reopened for the submission of new and material evidence and a
new decision, if the claimant demonstrates good cause for
failing to present the evidence before the record closed and if
the request is made within one year after the AU issued the
decision on the claim or before a decision is reached on appeal
by the Appeals Council, whichever is later.
D. Implementing these Recommendations
The above recommendations should be implemented as soon as
feasible. This can be done by regulation or other administrative action;
no legislation is required. Moreover, the SSA Counselor position can
be created without need for experimentation. 258 The regulations should
address closing the record at the AU stage and articulate a standard for
a good cause exception drawn from the current standard at the district
court.259 The regulations relating to the Counselor function should also
257 Commissioner Barnhart has recently proposed closing the record afler the ALI hearing.
See id.
258 If SSA were to initiate a renewed program for use of government "advocates," it should do
so only after an experiment that draws lessons from the SSARP. See supra Part IV (discussing
this point).
259 See 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (2003).
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include a code of conduct and other rules that emphasize the
nonadversarial nature of the position.260
260 The regulations, while procedural in nature and thereby exempt from notice and comment,
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2003), might still benefit from comments from the affected claimant
community.
